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ABSTRACT 
There is a general recognition and acceptance that small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs) are important contributors to social and economic development. However, in 
Africa which hosts many developing economies, SMEs must endure numerous 
challenges that tend to repress small enterprise development. Formal cluster 
development programmes have been identified as one progressive way of assisting 
SMEs to overcome the obstacles. It involves deliberately instituting and supporting 
small enterprise clusters. Although this idea of formal clustering of firms is relatively 
new to Africa, cluster development programmes are increasingly taking the form of 
small business incubation. Business incubation essentially aims to provide a systematic 
method of rendering business support services to fledgling small businesses to help 
them continually rise above market challenges and thrive. 
Some governments in Africa have embraced the notion and are incorporating plans into 
their local economic development (LED) programmes to enhance small business 
development through incubation. Countries like South Africa, Ghana, Kenya, and 
Nigeria have amongst the most conspicuous incubator programmes and cluster 
experiences on the African continent. This study interrogates the effectiveness of and 
hence the scope for formal business incubation or rigid clustering programmes in 
Africa. It assesses examples of both rigid and flexible clusters in a few African 
countries in order to identify their main differences and to thus establish some critical 
areas of business clustering needed for useful small and medium enterprise 
development in Africa. 
Upon reviewing case study literature, it is observed that formal incubation programmes 
are likely to be less effective in creating new SMEs compared to the more flexible 
clusters in Africa. Rigid clusters also tend to rely heavily on state funding, are more 
subjected to political interference, are prone to expansion capacity constraints, and are 
unlikely to sustain themselves financially in the long run. The study notes that rigid 
 
 
 
 
vi 
clustering mainly favours a high-tech environment. Hence, incubation programmes 
may be more suitable for advanced economies. For low-tech industries, on the other 
hand, formal business incubation may be inappropriate. 
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 Other researchers respectively use MSEs or SMMEs (MSMEs) instead of SMEs as a more precise 
exclusive or inclusive descriptor of firms not categorised as large. MSEs refers to Micro and Small 
Enterprises and SMMEs (MSMEs) stands for Small, Medium, and Micro Enterprises (Micro, Small, and 
Medium Enterprises). 
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CHAPTER 1: 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
It is now commonly accepted that small and medium enterprises (SMEs) form an 
important part of the economic and social development process in a country. Their 
role as sources of employment creation, income generation and poverty reduction 
makes them particularly significant for developing countries. Hence, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, many countries in Africa are striving to prioritise small enterprises 
in their economic development agenda (Rogerson, 2001). 
However, small enterprises in Africa encounter a myriad of constraints. They 
grapple with issues like inadequate access to financing, insufficient access to 
markets, excessive regulations, and low levels of education and skills, which often 
lead to high rates of small business stagnation and failure. These hurdles stifle the 
establishment and expansion of new businesses as well as the growth of existing 
ones. It is therefore critical to ensure that SMEs are able to withstand these 
challenges if they are to positively contribute to economic development. One 
avenue of doing so is to foster the clustering of small enterprises. 
Porter (2000:15) defines clusters as geographic concentrations of interconnected 
entities in related industries and other associated parties in a particular field that 
compete and cooperate with one another. Among other things, serendipity, natural 
resource endowments, proximity to demand, and the availability of physical 
infrastructure can draw firms to a particular place (Enright & Roberts, 2001:68). 
This phenomenon of enterprise clustering has received extensive research and 
policy attention around the world. In fact, clustering of activities was traditionally 
one way through which communities sustained themselves. By operating in close 
proximity, groups were able to use their synergy to achieve greater results.  
As presently understood, clustering of enterprises is central to achieving collective 
efficiency, improved competitiveness, and greater industrial capacity (Rogerson, 
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2008:324), because firms can access the benefits of agglomeration such as 
economies of scale, positive externalities or spill overs, and social capital 
networks. In addition, clustering makes it feasible to trigger developments that 
would not be tenable in the absence of a cluster. For instance, banks and other 
financial institutions can be launched in a locality with many people and a lot of 
business activity; and transport, communication, and other infrastructure can also 
be justified in such an area. Simply put, the presence of the cluster can spur a less 
developed region into prosperity (Schmitz & Nadvi, 1999).  
Cluster formation can be natural and informal or artificial and more structured. 
The former is a relatively slow process that has been at the heart of industrial 
growth and economic development processes of entire cities and regions while the 
latter, specifically in the form of small enterprise incubators has gained 
momentum as a possibly faster process. Overall, cluster development programmes 
are now increasingly shaping up as small business incubation programmes. A 
primary aim of business incubation is to systematically help both fledgling and 
maturing small businesses to overcome the challenges they encounter either at the 
micro, meso, or macro level. 
This dissertation largely focuses on cases of business clusters for small enterprise 
development in South Africa which is a major economic hub in Africa. The study 
endeavours to draw attention to clustering as an instrument for small enterprise 
development within an African context. Its author, who originates from Zambia 
and has studied in South Africa, wants to highlight the need for economic 
development policy in his country and the rest of Africa to actively target SMEs 
in order to exploit their latent ability to catalyse its general development. 
Thus, whilst much of the study focuses on the evolution of small business 
clustering in South Africa, lessons are to be drawn for Zambia (and other 
Southern African countries) and their efforts to stimulate local economic 
development through SME clustering. 
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1.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Clustering is currently being hailed as a propeller of small enterprise development 
in both developed and developing countries alike. Nevertheless, despite its 
emergence as a crucial intervention for SME development in many parts of the 
developing world, deliberate cluster development remains underutilised in 
economic development policy in Africa (Meagher, 2007). Thus, although informal 
business activity clustering in African societies has existed for many years, more 
formal clustering of firms like hives and incubators are a relatively novel idea in 
African development strategising.  
Notwithstanding the infancy of the small business incubation phenomenon in 
Africa, some governments have embraced the notion and are incorporating plans 
in their local economic development (LED) programmes to enhance small 
businesses through incubation. Countries like South Africa, Ghana, Kenya and 
Nigeria already have noticeable incubator programmes and cluster experience. 
The main question now is whether these programmes are effective in their quest to 
enhance small enterprise development and what lessons can be drawn from them 
to improve future cluster development in Africa. 
In this context, an enterprise incubator or cluster programme is effective if, among 
other things, it fosters small enterprise start-ups, helps them negotiate their way 
through inherent market and non-market barriers, enhances their growth through 
innovation and technology diffusion, and contributes to regional development. As 
argued by the Centre for Strategy and Evaluation Studies (CSES), an incubator or 
cluster must not only be effective but also relevant, efficient, utilised, and 
sustainable for it to achieve the goals of small business development promotion. 
1.3 AIMS OF THE STUDY 
Against the above background, this study tries to summarise and critically assess 
South Africa’s small business clustering process, taking into account the different 
types of clustering and the way government and other stakeholders have supported 
the process. As a second goal, the study aims to draw lessons from the South 
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African experience which are relevant for other Southern African development 
environments. In all of this, particular emphasis is to fall on the role of local 
government in the promotion of small business clustering. 
1.4 APPROACH TO THE RESEARCH 
The study first of all tries to put the clustering process into a broad historical 
context, distinguishing between spontaneous and ‘steered’ clustering and between 
flexible and tightly structured incubator clustering. Against that background we 
try to show how important these clustering processes could be for Africa’s local 
economic development. 
Case studies are predominantly used in a lot of cluster literature to assess the 
impacts of clusters and clustering on small enterprise development. This study 
uses cases in South Africa and also refers to a few others in Ghana, Kenya and 
Nigeria to form inferences about clustering and incubation in Africa. The two 
cases in South Africa are a group of seven Furniture Technology Centre 
(Furntech) incubators and the Witwatersrand Clothing Cluster respectively, 
representing a rigid and structured approach to clustering and a flexible or 
unstructured one. The international references to small firm clustering also fall 
within this spectrum. 
The study mainly employs qualitative research methods in its attempt to answer 
the research questions and achieve the stated aims. It mostly relies on secondary 
sources including annual reports, journal articles, books, and relevant internet-
based papers and official websites to extract and gather the background data and 
information for the literature review and a few international case studies that 
contextually describe the process of small enterprise clustering and incubation in 
Africa. 
 
 
 
 
5 
1.5 DELIMITATION OF THE STUDY 
One of the main limitations to the study is the unavailability of detailed data and 
information. The case study analyses in the project are therefore not very detailed, 
especially for the flexible clusters as these usually have inadequate records about 
their structure and operations or do not keep any records at all. The preceding 
concern also limits the study to only focus on cluster-level features of small 
enterprise development and as such no firm-level factors are comprehensively 
considered in the analysis. Furthermore, this thesis confines its discussion to small 
and medium-sized firms within a cluster. Even though the presence of larger and 
mature firms may be significant for a cluster, the matter is ignored, because 
cluster and clustering effects on large firms is a theme that falls outside the aims 
of the dissertation. The study considers clustering as a tool for SME development 
from the perspective of accelerating the creation of thriving new SMEs. Besides, 
smaller firms are most in need of support to survive and grow. 
1.6 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
The research paper consists of seven chapters. The next chapter identifies and 
explains the three different forms of clustering which are found in the literature. 
Chapter 3 then discusses the importance of clustering for small enterprise 
development in Africa, where governments are keen to harness the potential of 
SMEs to reduce unemployment and poverty. In Chapter 4, the South African case 
studies – the Furntech Business Technology Incubation (BTI) programme and the 
Witwatersrand clothing cluster experience – are analysed. This is followed by a 
chapter on four other African cases of cluster developments. This (Chapter 5) also 
covers efforts or opportunities for pro-active cluster developments in Zambia. 
Chapter 6 draws lessons from the case study analyses and suggests courses of 
action for cluster policy in Africa. The last chapter summarises the report and its 
conclusions. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
FORMS OF SMALL ENTERPRISE CLUSTERING 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Clusters of firms are geographic concentrations of interconnected companies, 
specialised suppliers, service providers, firms in related industries, and associated 
institutions like universities, standards agencies, and trade associations in a 
particular field (Porter, 2000:15). Among other things, natural resource 
endowments, proximity to demand, and the availability of physical infrastructure 
can draw firms to a particular place (Enright and Roberts, 2001:68). The 
formation of firm clusters can also be a result of serendipitous events. In the 
cluster literature an industrial cluster or simply a cluster, in fact, refers to any 
cluster of firms in related industries, irrespective of the sizes of these firms. 
However, any reference to a cluster in this study refers to a cluster of small and 
medium sized firms in related industries. Moreover, cluster formation can be 
natural or artificial. 
Natural clustering occurs when firms are attracted to a specific locality for 
whatever reason without any deliberate intervention from any source. These kinds 
of clusters usually begin as small entities but can eventually become bigger, more 
competitive, and evolve into regional centres, albeit in a slow and less systematic 
but dynamic manner. In contrast, artificial clusters tend to be formed for a specific 
purpose in addition to the greater goal of accelerating small enterprise 
development in a sector and/or region. Enterprise development is synonymously 
used with business development in this study and it essentially means an increase 
in the establishment of new firms and the expansion of existing firms. Artificial 
clusters can furthermore be flexible or rigid. The flexible ones are not confined by 
strict rules while the rigid clusters follow a specific operating framework.  
Much of the cluster literature presupposes an already existing cluster. It usually 
ignores the factors that make a cluster appear in the first place and thus does not 
explain the requisite conditions for it to form (Brown & McNaughton, 2003; 
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Feldman & Francis, 2004). This chapter reviews cluster literature, with the focus 
on the three categories of small enterprise clusters: natural clusters, flexible 
clusters, and rigid clusters. It considers what they are, their formation, and their 
main characteristic features. In essence, the review explores why either the 
flexible or inflexible clusters are desirable tools for faster and structured small 
business development. Such insight will help to identify fundamental 
distinguishing features of these forms of small enterprise clusters which should 
not be ignored in cluster development policy. 
Whilst this study tries to make a contribution to the strategising of small enterprise 
clusters and incubators in Africa (i.e. countries like Zambia), we first have to get 
the broader (historical) process of clustering into perspective. It is for this purpose 
that the distinction between natural, flexible and rigid clustering seems relevant. 
2.2 NATURAL CLUSTERING 
A cluster can be deemed as natural if its formation is the result of a “spontaneous 
tendency for SMEs of the same sub-sector to locate close to each other” 
(UNCTAD, 2005:11). It may not be readily traced to any intentional and planned 
decision from a certain source like a large company or state policy. Natural 
clustering thus entails the self-organisation of entrepreneurial activity in a random 
manner (Feldman & Francis, 2004:131). As such, the natural clustering process 
takes time. In an attempt to explain the origins of Silicon Valley, one of the most 
investigated clusters, Sturgeon (2000:16) stresses that the natural industrial 
development of an area is never instantaneous. The beginnings of such a cluster 
very much depend on place and historical context. Many natural clusters are the 
result of an unplanned external stimulus. This stimulus or a combination of 
stimuli, be it corporate downsizing, a crisis, a discontinuity in an industry, or a 
technological opportunity, urge potential entrepreneurs to engage in starting 
companies (Feldman & Francis, 2004:131). This section looks at some examples 
of natural clustering processes. 
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2.2.1 Urbanisation 
The long run process of urbanisation, i.e. the shift of people from dispersed 
settlements in rural areas to more concentrated settlements in urban areas 
constitutes one of the most basic forms of business clustering. It is also a process 
where the differences between developed and un(der)developed countries has 
been most striking. Most developed countries have 65-85 percent urbanisation 
compared to 25-45 percent for most African countries. 
Amongst others, urbanisation relates to the level of industrialisation in urban 
areas. Industrial expansion in these areas usually is the result of growing urban 
populations. Historically in many economies, according to Enright and Roberts 
(2001:67), as an industry emerges new firms are founded. In this process, other 
supporting firms to supply inputs and services also appear and soon the area 
begins to bulge. The authors indicate that economies develop through the 
emergence of regional clusters. Regional clusters forming in urban areas are likely 
to have a greater impact on industrial progress than those in rural areas, if there 
are any at all. These urban regional clusters are not static. Their boundaries evolve 
continuously as technological and market developments produce even more new 
industries, create more new linkages, and change the nature of existing markets 
(Porter, 2000:18). 
While it is clear that urbanisation in Africa is low, it is rising and the number of 
urban SMEs is increasing rapidly (Helmsing, 2003:70). This means that 
industrialisation in the developing countries of Africa is not a distant prospect, 
especially if African governments create enabling environments for this type of 
clustering process to expand. For example, governments can concentrate public 
infrastructure in some locations to attract new firms and the formation of urban 
clusters could follow naturally. 
Over the past few decades the pace of urbanisation in Africa has been quite 
unequal. Whilst a number of the capital cities in African countries have grown to 
mega-centres of 2-10 million people (with much scope for clustering), the range 
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of dynamic, medium-sized urban centres has been limited (which dampened the 
clustering process). 
2.2.2 Product specialisation and supply chain development 
Since regions are not equally endowed with natural, human and other resources, it 
is natural for local enterprises to specialise in production activities according to 
regional endowments. Thus, firms will tend to cluster to take advantage of the 
economies of agglomeration. Enright and Roberts (2001:81) observe that the 
process of specialisation and global integration occurring in small regional firms 
and industries is leading to the development of local clusters and industry 
networks. With such clusters developing, a supply chain inevitably develops. In 
the supply chain, SMEs have the capability to provide goods and services which 
reduce the costs and dependency of large firms on imported supplies (UNCTAD, 
2005:36). All of this can gradually strengthen a spontaneous clustering process. 
2.2.3 Ad hoc factors 
Once-off events occurring in a certain place often present SMEs with new 
prospects to serve as suppliers. In this way, firms from different specific sectors 
become attracted to an emerging cluster and partner around the occurrence. This 
may relate to developments in tourism, agriculture, transport (e.g. a harbour) or 
public administration sectors. For example, major sporting occasions may draw 
relevant enterprises together, because some of the tenders may be too large for 
existing firms to handle. Even when a calamity befalls a nation or war breaks out, 
the need arises for enterprises to provide the required products and services and 
clusters form. Thus, over the ages complex historical factors and forces have 
shaped much of the business clustering process in developing countries. 
The selfish approach of Africa’s Colonial powers, who primarily looked for 
people (slaves), natural resources (minerals) and export opportunities during the 
colonial era throttled most of the natural clustering opportunities on the continent. 
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Leaving aside natural (or incremental) clustering processes, we now come to 
deliberate efforts by (local) government or other development stakeholders to pro-
actively support, steer or accelerate the clustering process at local level. Here we 
can distinguish two types of strategies: the more flexible support of clustering 
opportunities – which we call “flexible clustering” – and the more focused 
development of business incubators, which we call “rigid clustering”. Each of 
these will be discussed briefly. 
2.3 FLEXIBLE CLUSTERING 
A cluster that is formed and sustained on premeditated grounds, especially 
through governmental action, is a flexible “artificial” cluster, because it did not 
emerge naturally, but was the result of a planned policy. Empirically, this latter 
definition of an artificial cluster points to a cluster that is more likely to be 
successful than a rigid one. Feldman and Francis (2004:129) state that many 
attempts to artificially establish a cluster where none existed previously (for 
example the Science Park in Taiwan or some of the Bio-Regio clusters in 
Germany) have failed. 
Unlike a rigid cluster, a flexible one does not necessarily follow a fixed operating 
programme. It may be geographically bound within a specific location and 
initially confined within a building, but it usually has scope for expansion. 
Proximity of firms defines the cluster, i.e. the participating firms gain from 
external economies and joint action. These clusters do not form as a direct result 
of a strict policy or programme. Rather, the need for supportive intervention arises 
when the firms begin to cluster around each other in a certain local activity or 
place. Thus, the cluster and its characteristics develop from the individual 
activities of the entrepreneurs and the organisations and institutions that emerge to 
support them (Feldman & Francis, 2004). This section briefly describes a few 
examples of flexible clusters.  
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2.3.1 South African Small Business Hives 
In South Africa, the idea of small business “hives” was an example of artificial 
clusters that followed a relatively flexible, though carefully planned approach. It 
was initiated by the Small Business Development Corporation (SBDC, now 
Business Partners), based on the idea of beehive activity. According to Thomas 
(2009:9), the corporation tried to expedite small enterprise establishments and 
expansion by offering comprehensive support to small and medium enterprises 
clustered around a centre, building or narrowly demarcated area. These centres 
were usually old buildings which were no longer in use. The rationale was to 
provide resident enterprises with cheap accommodation as well as various 
business support services supplied in the area. 
During the years 1984-94 the SBDC created about 40 such hives across the 
country, utilising old factory complexes or other vacant structures. With the help 
of government funds, these larger structures were sub-divided into smaller units, 
with some of the larger hives having about 150-200 subdivided premises. In a few 
cases public funds were used to construct new factory clusters, much like 
industrial parks. 
The hives were leased at relatively very low rentals, which was one of the 
incentives for the small business tenants. In addition, SBDC established 
information offices, training facilities, exhibition space and other services for the 
tenants. In some cases this included the establishment of machinery facilities 
which were needed by industrialists but could not be afforded by them (e.g. 
specialised sewing machines in clothing clusters). 
It was the intention with these SBDC-hives that the (SBDC-employed) hive 
manager could, in close cooperation with the hive-tenants or local entrepreneurs, 
organise all the important support services which the cluster needed. This might 
include getting local bankers to open an office in the hive (to be in closer contact 
with tenants as potential bank clients), organising regular exhibitions and/or 
training courses or getting different local operators to work together more closely 
in order to reap the benefits of scale economies. 
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The results of the 10 years of hives were mixed. Some were managed well and 
showed dynamic growth. Others, especially where management was weak or the 
hives were too small, struggled to survive. When the SBDC was transformed into 
Business Partners, most of these efforts unfortunately ended, since government 
funding stopped. 
Thus, the hive initiative had mixed results, often falling short of its intended 
targets as the initial support structure was either too weak and/or discontinued 
(Thomas, 2009:12). It shows that clusters without continued top down support are 
seldom self-sustaining. 
2.3.2 Private Business and Office Parks 
Business parks fall in the same category as industrial estates, managed workshops, 
and enterprise centres. According to CSES (2002a:6) industrial estates, and by 
extension business parks, normally do not have a strict process of admitting firms. 
Besides, they provide little or no management support and have no structure 
regarding business activities and level of technology. These types of artificial 
clusters, in the very least, only provide operating premises for SMEs which is 
better than nothing because they are usually properly located to give the small 
firms a head start. The strategic location of business parks allows for the 
formation of regional economic zones in which the benefits of clustering such as 
product specialisation and regional development can be harnessed. Moreover, the 
fact that firms are also in close proximity to related SMEs gives them a chance to 
interact and learn from each other. 
2.3.3 Linkages between Transnational Corporations and SMEs 
Transnational Corporations (TNCs) are usually responsible for foreign direct 
investment in developing countries. Their impact on local economies can, 
however, be double-edged. TNCs are potential sources of technological and skills 
transfers and other spill overs to existing firms, but they also possess the ability to 
crowd out domestic firms. Not least affected by TNCs are SMEs. Relatively 
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smaller enterprises can benefit a great deal from being able to supply to large 
corporations in a particular area. Despite such possibility for the smaller 
enterprises, UNCTAD (2005:25) notes that most SMEs are not linked to TNCs at 
all. They perceive the large firms more as threats than opportunities to their 
growth. Thus, such positive interaction is not automatic and requires concerted 
efforts from both the TNCs and SMEs as well as the government, who should 
foster linkages between them. Linkages between TNCs and SMEs through local 
sourcing can be critical because the corporations then have a cheaper and more 
flexible source of inputs and other supplies and the SMEs have a market for their 
products. History is full of examples where SMEs cluster around TNCs. For 
instance, a large mining company could have different suppliers to cater for its 
various needs ranging from shaft equipment, transport, stationery, food and 
services. 
2.4 INCUBATORS AS THE CORE OF RIGID CLUSTERING 
Small business incubators offer a paradigm for the rigid clustering model. These 
are usually organised centres with strict admission rules, providing comprehensive 
management and administrative support, and having a specialised focus with 
respect to the technology level of tenant firms. 
2.4.1 Defining small business incubation 
Small business incubation is the process in which new small enterprises are 
effectively created in an environment providing a significant range of essential 
services which the firms would struggle to access otherwise (Adegbite, 2001:157). 
It is a “dynamic process where young firms are nurtured to help them to survive 
and grow during periods of uncertainty, particularly during the start-up phase” 
(Bhabra-Remedios & Cornelius, 2003:3). Ideally, incubation involves all activities 
from the time a start-up or fledgling company is screened for admission into an 
incubator up to the time it is required to exit the incubator to operate 
independently. The small business incubator facilitates this incubation process. 
 
 
 
 
14 
Thus, incubators are one form of agglomeration meant to enhance the survival and 
growth rates of new and fledgling establishments respectively. A business 
incubator is commonly described as a facility that provides favourable controlled 
conditions to aid the growth of new business undertakings (Petree, Petkov & 
Spiro, 1997:3). By design, incubators deal with inherent market failures such as 
asymmetric information and poor access to capital through the use of pooled 
resources. Hackett and Dilts (2004:57) define a business incubator as a shared 
office space facility that seeks to provide its incubatees with a strategic, value-
adding intervention system of monitoring and business assistance. Put differently, 
incubators are mostly about business support networks and technological 
innovation programmes. Like the flexible clusters, business incubators also 
stimulate an entrepreneurial spirit and the materialisation of newly founded SMEs 
and, more broadly, they encourage the innovation and adaptation of technology as 
well as spurring local and regional economic development (Al-Mubaraki & 
Busler, 2010:2). 
The four prominent components of small business incubators in existing research 
are: shared office space; a pool of shared support services that reduce operating 
costs; professional business advice; and network provision. 
Notwithstanding the similarities between different definitions, the practicality of 
the incubator concept remains murky. According to Bergek and Norrman 
(2008:21), one of the issues around this concept is the disagreement regarding 
whether an incubator is an organisation or simply an entrepreneurial environment. 
Another issue is the period of incubation needed for a fledgling firm to be 
discharged from the incubator. Thirdly, uncertainty surrounds which part of the 
enterprise development process is to be taken into account as “incubation”, which 
differentiates incubators from technology or science parks. 
In addition, Bhabra-Remedios and Cornelius (2003) are of the view that the term 
business incubator could be used to describe a span of organisations, like techno-
poles and science parks, which somehow help entrepreneurs to develop their ideas 
from scratch to full commercialisation. In that context, incubators are also referred 
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to as innovation centres, business enterprise centres, and technology centres. 
Despite this description issue, most researchers seem to agree that incubation is 
related to the early phase of a business establishment. Bergek and Norrman 
(2008:21) thus conclude that the incubator concept should be reserved as a 
descriptor for support aimed at the development of “immature” enterprises and not 
for aid channelled towards organisations like science parks which are generally 
designed to support more mature firms. 
2.4.2 Types of incubators 
The properties of a well-established and fully-functional incubator make the 
prospects of its existence attractive to government, local economic development 
agencies, and research institutions. As discussed in the previous section, various 
interested parties have adopted incubators because therein lies the prospect of 
reducing start-up failure and accelerating the process of new business creation. 
Incubators could be grouped on the basis of their use or by their sponsorship 
(Bhabra-Remedios & Cornelius, 2003). From a functional perspective an 
incubator can be involved in developing products or manufacturing. This means 
that the firms targeted for incubation would have a sector-specific function or 
belong to a particular industry. With respect to funding, Allen and McCluskey 
(1990) categorised sponsors as private, public, university, or a combination of 
these, including the public-private partnership hybrid. Another feature that could 
differentiate business incubators is geographic location, for example CBB-based, 
industrial area based, located near a university, close to the harbour (for exports) 
or in a distinct geographic setting (for tourism or agriculture). 
Incubators inside these different groupings are very likely to be similar in terms of 
their missions, policies, services, and performance. Moreover, public incubators 
generally subscribe to the non-profit motive while private ones seek profit. The 
preceding distinction is critical because it helps to explain differences in the 
activities and outcomes pursued by different incubators. Non-profit incubation 
programmes usually embrace missions focused on economic development 
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outcomes. The majority of for-profit programmes may strive to maximise 
shareholders’ return on investments (Al-Mubaraki & Busler, 2010:3), although 
large corporations could also have a strong development motive, especially if 
some public-private partnership is possible. 
Four different groups of incubators identified by Allen and McCluskey (1990:64) 
are for-profit property development incubators; non-profit development 
corporation incubators; academic incubators; and business development for-profit 
seed capital incubators. The authors define “for-profit property development 
incubators” as those that essentially want to take advantage of “real estate 
appreciation” while the non-profit incubators fundamentally focus on job creation 
and the enhancement of an entrepreneurial climate. Non-profit incubators have 
been found to be dominant in the United States of America accounting for an 
approximated 85 percent of the total incubator population in 2002 (Linder, 2002, 
as cited by Al-Mubaraki & Busler, 2010:3). Academic incubators are those that 
pursue the commercialisation of university knowledge and technology, and the 
for-profit seed capital incubators primarily want to cluster the firms in their 
portfolio in order to exercise proper control over them. 
In Europe, public incubators include business innovation centres and university 
business incubators, whose research can lead to, among other things, the diffusion 
of technology (Chiesa & Piccaluga, 2000; Schutte, 1999). Private incubators can 
also be segmented into two groups: corporate private incubators (CPIs) that are 
owned by large companies and established in order to support the rise of new 
enterprises; and independent private incubators (IPIs) owned by individuals 
venturing to help rising entrepreneurs in creating and growing their business (Von 
Zedtwitz, 2003, as cited by Grimandi & Grandi, 2005). 
Adegbite (2001) grouped business incubators in the Nigerian context into two 
broad types. The first of these involves industrial business incubators “which are 
generalised industrial nurseries for nurturing new business start-ups with a view to 
promoting entrepreneurship and stimulating the emergence of industrial 
establishments at the small/medium enterprise level”. The other type includes the 
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technology-focused business incubators “aimed at innovative, technology-oriented 
small and medium scale enterprises desirous of commercialising research and 
development results, especially from the research institutions, with a view to 
promoting technological innovation and entrepreneurship development” 
(Adegbite, 2001:158). 
2.4.3 Virtual Incubators 
The incubator literature also identifies a type of incubator that does not restrict 
incipient firms to a physical building located at a particular site, but allows 
incubatees to access incubator services while having their own premises. This is 
known as virtual incubation. It offers a more flexible approach to incubation. 
Petersen (2011:38) does, however, point out the complexity of such an incubator 
model with respect to its ability to cater for all the firms under its auspices. The 
author attributes this to the absence of a contiguous environment between the 
firms and the service providers. 
We shall return to the potential role of virtual incubation after the case study 
chapter, when we look at practical approaches to clustering in Africa. 
2.4.4 The economic role of incubators 
The importance of incubation in small business development cannot be over-
emphasised. Business incubators have a burgeoning role to play in encouraging 
entrepreneurship, promoting start-up businesses and cultivating economic 
development (Qian, Haynes & Riggle, 2011). NBIA has researched the 
circumstances of business incubators in America since the mid 1980s. It has 
tracked the progress of incubators and their economic impact on local 
communities. A study by McKinnon and Hayhow (1998, as cited by Bhabra-
Remedios & Cornelius, 2003) showed that incubators were meeting their goals as 
important tools of economic development, providing a wide range of services to 
incubatees.  
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Incubation programmes are able to achieve several objectives, like helping 
minority entrepreneurs, commercialising novel technologies from universities, 
diversifying local economies, developing markets and creating jobs (Al-Mubaraki 
& Busler, 2010:2). The economic role of incubators is therefore to catalyse the 
formation and successful operation of small enterprises and to foster the diffusion 
and commercialisation of innovative production technology. 
Naturally, the role of incubators will differ significantly in local economies which 
have different levels of development. Thus, there is a vast difference between “hi-
tech incubators” in the United States and the developed European and Asean 
economies and incubator efforts in underdeveloped African cities. It is the 
accommodation of these differences which constitutes the ultimate challenge in 
any incubator strategy. And it is here where lessons learned in South Africa may 
be of particular significance for other African economies. 
2.5 INCUBATOR PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
Since the goals of an incubator are inextricably linked to its type or the focus of its 
activities, it is common to evaluate incubators on the basis of meeting their 
objectives. For instance, most public incubators would pursue job creation, which 
can thus be used as a performance indicator to assess such incubators. In the 
incubator evaluation literature the concept of incubator performance mainly 
encompasses the goal achievement of an activity (Ramluckan, 2010). It means 
that measuring incubator performance needs to relate the actual outcomes to 
expected goals or planned objectives. Incubator performance is hence defined as 
“the extent to which incubator outcomes correspond to incubator goals” (Bergek 
& Norrman, 2008:22).  
A generally accepted set of incubator performance indicators is until now still 
evasive (Phan, Siegel & Wright, 2005:170). Different researchers have identified 
different performance indicators for incubators in their research. For instance, 
Scaramuzzi (2002) outlines indicators recommended by UNIDO (1997) for 
evaluating incubator performance in developing countries. Some researchers have 
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even distinguished between indicators that are relevant for specific regions. In 
their literature review Allen and McCluskey (1990) mention performance 
measures such as changes in tenants’ number of employees; how long the 
incubator has operated; and the survival rate of the incubatees. Mian (1997) 
identifies four dimensions in his performance assessment criteria of university 
technology business incubators: growth and sustainability of the incubator 
programme; tenant survival and growth; extent to which the mission of a 
sponsoring university is achieved; and community-related impacts. 
The value that a business incubator would like to add to its clients entails 
providing a combination of facilities and services that are difficult to access 
otherwise (Bhabra-Remedios & Cornelius, 2003). The nature of services and how 
they are delivered are likely to impact on the survival and growth of incubatees 
and by extension the performance of the incubator. An effective incubator would 
thus be one which adds significant value to its tenant firms. In this case, value is 
judged in terms the availability of the relevant services necessary for incubatees to 
succeed. Mian (1997) suggested that among the performance measures for 
incubators, and consequently their effectiveness, should be an increase in rentable 
space and an increase in tenant sales as well as the number of visitors to the 
incubator. 
According to Aerts, Matthyssens and Vandenbempt (2007), when the variable(s) 
to be used to measure incubator performance have been chosen, the next step is to 
decide on the unit of comparison that enables the researcher to validate the 
outcome of the performance measure. Direct comparisons between tenant and 
non-tenant firms’ survival rates could prove to be meaningless as the use of 
selection criteria in admitting tenants to the incubator results in a selection bias. 
Moreover, the rate of firm survival is likely to suffer from an endogeneity issue as 
incubators are particularly designed to increase life span (Phan et al., 2005:170). 
The authors deem it more worthwhile to rather compare tenant survival rates 
among different incubators. 
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2.6 CONCLUSION 
Despite the lack of an explicit distinction in the literature, the chapter attempted to 
separate the clustering process into two broad forms namely the natural and the 
artificial. Artificial clustering was further divided between rigid and flexible type 
of clustering. The model of a rigid cluster used is the small business incubator that 
follows a set of rules from admission to incubation to discharge, while the flexible 
cluster does not have such a structure.  
Both the rigid and flexible clusters are established to help small businesses 
overcome growth constraints through the provision of fundamental support 
services at the initial stages of establishment. Whether this is achieved or not boils 
down to the few but significant characteristic differences between the extent of 
rigidity and flexibility of the cluster. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
CLUSTERING FOR SMALL ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Small businesses in Africa face a plethora of difficulties like inadequate access to 
financing and insufficient access to markets which often lead to a high rate of 
small business stagnation and eventual failure. These constraints hinder the 
establishment and expansion of new businesses as well as the growth and 
development of existing ones. A need thus arises for a multifaceted approach to 
ease, or prevent, the effects of such challenges. Clustering of business activities 
represents one relevant approach. The formation of clusters brings with it 
economies of scale attached to agglomeration, positive externalities, and social 
capital networks. Thus, support for clustering is seen to be central to achieving 
“collective efficiency” and the improved competitiveness of localised clusters of 
activity (Rogerson, 2008:324). 
Despite its emergence as a crucial intervention for small business development in 
many parts of the developing world, cluster development remains underutilised in 
economic development policy in Africa (Meagher, 2007). A primary aim of 
cluster development is to help both fledgling and maturing small businesses to 
thrive and continually overcome the challenges they encounter either at the micro, 
sector, and macro level so that they can grow and make a meaningful contribution 
to local economic development. Regional or local economic development entails 
elevating the economic potential of a particular area through activities that lead to 
poverty reduction by creating jobs and other income-generating activities; the 
creation and expansion of new businesses and strengthening the entrepreneurial 
spirit. 
This chapter delves into some of the more general constraints to small business 
development in Africa. It thereby highlights some of the ways through which 
clustering interventions can mitigate the challenges and culminates into some 
specific aspects of cluster development policy that validate its use as an LED 
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intervention in Africa. We first look at the “drivers” of local development in the 
emerging African economies, followed by a discussion of different roles through 
which clusters can advance the local business development process. Thereafter, 
we come back to the differentiation of flexible and rigid clustering in Africa, 
showing that the flexible type may initially be the more important one through 
which one can accelerate the LED process. 
3.2 DRIVERS OF AFRICAN BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT 
If we look at the long term process of African business and economic 
development, a number of forces can be seen as driving that process. These forces 
include 
• the population growth rate and the steady increase in urbanisation levels, 
leading towards small, medium and larger urban agglomerations; 
• the steady rise in average income levels, which leads to a widening of 
consumer demand and expansions in the production base; 
• the wider and better utilisation of local raw materials and land resources, 
leading to mining and agricultural developments (for local use and exports); 
• the gradual expansion in local infrastructure facilities to cover more areas in 
countries and a greater part of local communities and 
• the gradual diversification of local economies, including the growth of local 
industrial sub-sectors and services. 
In all of these processes, small business development can and should play a 
significant role, even though there are many obstacles in its way. It is here where 
the clustering process can play such an important role in facilitating small 
business development and thereby helping to accelerate the local development 
process. 
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One fundamental concern to economic development in Africa is that many of the 
micro and small scale enterprises in leading economies like South Africa as well 
as the greater sub-Saharan African region are survivalist. A survivalist endeavour 
is one that is not primarily driven by a profit motive but rather the subsistence of 
its owner, usually because the owner is unable to find paid employment (DTI 
White Paper, 1995:7). In addition to having too many survivalist ventures, even 
those small enterprises striving for profitability and growth face diverse obstacles 
and challenges. These include inadequate access to skills, training, and 
information; poor regulations; inadequate access to finance; inadequate market 
demand; insufficient infrastructure; and crime (Richter, 2003:9). Moreover, 
although globalisation and liberalisation of markets may be hailed as creating 
opportunities for SMEs in Africa to thrive, the consequent international 
competition, coupled with other issues are often impediments to the 
establishment, growth, and proliferation of small businesses on the continent. 
Because SMEs are exposed to so many challenges, a lot of private as well as 
public sector interventions have been undertaken to curtail these hurdles. Among 
these are economic empowerment programmes, like Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE) in South Africa and Citizen Economic Empowerment 
(CEE) in Zambia, the establishment of microfinance institutions to deal with the 
financing issues faced by the smaller enterprises and infrastructure development 
programmes. 
Lately, cluster development programmes have received increased attention as 
channels for such small business development. Clustering of firms appears to 
potentially offer a set of comprehensive solutions to the myriad problems 
associated with small enterprises. 
The next subsections try to show how clustering can help address some of these 
challenges. 
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3.3 CLUSTERS AS DRIVERS OF SECTOR SPECIALISATION AND 
INNOVATION 
Cluster development falls within the ambit of local and regional economic 
development initiatives of government. The success of any national economic 
development programme is very much a function of its local economic 
development programmes as stronger regional economic bases can strengthen the 
national economy. Raines (2001) notes that many industrialised countries, 
particularly in Europe, have incorporated cluster development policy into national 
development policy. In that context, Rogerson (2008:317) emphasises the 
importance of integrating localised processes and networks in clusters into 
regional economic development programmes in Africa. 
Helmsing (2003:69) posits that not only does cluster development involve 
specialisation in a market framework but it also entails overcoming obstacles met 
during the pursuit of specialisation. On one hand, clustered firms gain access to 
Marshallian externalities, which essentially means that firms can access more 
suppliers and specialised support services, experienced and skilled labour pools 
and the inevitable knowledge leakage that occurs where people meet and talk 
about business (Rosenfeld, 2002:5). On the other hand, the development of 
industry-specific clusters of firms means specialising in producing goods or 
providing services distinctive to that industry and region. Specialised production 
is seen to be at the heart of most successful local and regional economies albeit to 
different extents. A few examples of prominent places in the United States clearly 
associated with unique industrial activities are computers and semiconductors in 
Silicon Valley, movies in Hollywood, automobiles in Detroit, biotechnology in 
Boston, and medical devices in Minneapolis (Feldman & Francis, 2005:127). 
It is the competition amid cooperating firms within a specialised cluster that leads 
to better production methods (Porter, 2000). Where social capital is high, there are 
strong interpersonal communication channels improving the likelihood of 
innovation being diffused to members of a specific cluster. As a result, unlike 
those in isolated locations, firms in a cluster are more flexible in that they are able 
to discern changes in market demand much quicker; they can experiment with 
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ideas at cheaper cost; and they can adopt new production technology faster and 
adapt to technological changes better (Enright & Roberts, 2001; McCormick, 
1998). 
In an environment where innovation is rife, clustering can potentially increase the 
industrial capacity of African countries and make it possible for them to deal with 
some of the obstacles to industrial development and urbanisation. Industrialisation 
refers to the increased capacity of adding value to raw materials to produce 
useable goods. In Africa where the industrialisation process is still lagging behind 
and most active clusters are nothing more than groups of very small firms 
operating at low levels of technology, enterprise clustering is a platform for such a 
process to accelerate because it allows for firms to specialise and differentiate 
themselves (McCormick, 1998). 
3.4 CLUSTERS AND ACCESS TO LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL 
MARKETS 
Low demand at the local level is another key constraint which small businesses in 
Africa have to contend with (Liedholm & Mead, 1999:30). Large firms tend to 
capture a considerable part of the market which leaves small firms with an even 
smaller share amongst themselves. Moreover, the market of tenders for 
governmental procurement, the market of subcontracts with big firms and the 
export market are usually beyond the reach of small firms due to a lack of relevant 
technology or skills, and their incapacity to meet required quality standards and 
regulations (Richter, 2003:13). In fact, non-financial constraints, most notably 
access to markets, loom large among their needs with key issues being those of 
finding buyers for their products and suppliers for needed inputs (Rogerson, 
2001:121). 
Due to globalisation and the liberalisation of markets, the capability of SMEs to 
compete within international markets is severely hampered, which can be ‘fatal’ 
to emerging industries in African countries. Brown and McNaughton (2003) 
emphasise the intense international dimension attached to present market 
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frameworks because of globalisation. They cite this as a reason why small firms, 
which are weary of international competition, would benefit from operating in a 
cluster of identical firms. 
Globalisation and liberalisation do not, however, only present a competitive threat 
but also present opportunities (Helmsing, 2003). With greater mobility of 
production factors, clusters can increase exports and attract foreign investment 
(Porter, 2000:16). This means that firms in clusters may gain access to bigger 
markets. Therefore, it is imperative for government to consider placing the focus 
of export promotion on clusters. Due to the benefits of operating within a cluster, 
firms grow their industrial capacity and by extension the cluster expands in its 
industrial capacity. The specialisation in production means that the cluster 
becomes more productive and competitive and can therefore use its competitive 
advantage to tap into export markets (Helmsing, 2003). 
3.5 CLUSTERS AND THE ACCESSIBILITY OF FINANCE 
The inadequacy of sources of finance is amongst the most cited barriers to small 
business establishment, let alone growth and development (Adegbite, 1997; DTI 
White Paper, 1995; Liedholm & Mead, 1999; Richter, 2003; Rogerson, 2001; 
Rosenfeld, 2002; Thomas, 2003). Every small business needs finance. In the 
absence of such funding, it is difficult for the entrepreneur to establish and grow a 
business. Formal lending institutions like commercial banks are often reluctant to 
provide the financing because the risk of failure attached to smaller ventures is 
significant. Hence, many entrepreneurs, particularly owners of micro enterprises, 
rely on their own savings and/or help from their friends and family in order to 
venture into business (Phillips & Bhatia-Panthaki, 2007). This, however, is 
normally insufficient for growth into viable enterprises. 
Clusters can attract formal sources of funding from both the private and public 
sectors because the risks and thus the chances of business failure are reduced. 
Incubators can particularly be more successful at accessing formal sources of 
finance because they are well-structured. For flexible clusters, informal sources 
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such as professional moneylenders, also become more reachable. From a cost and 
profitability viewpoint, it is more feasible to provide financial services when firms 
are clustered in a specific area than when they are scattered. Thus, Rogerson 
(2001:129) finds enough grounds to conclude that many credit-providers in Africa 
are able to cover most of their cost using group lending systems and achieve 
economies of scale via lending to large numbers of people. 
3.6 CLUSTERS AND ACCESS TO SKILLS, TRAINING AND 
INFORMATION 
A basic level of knowledge and skills is essential for the running of any enterprise, 
whether a large or small one. The most competitive and technologically advanced 
SMEs are usually run by well-educated entrepreneurs (UNECA, 2001:13). It is 
usually the owners of survivalist and micro enterprises that are most constrained 
by not having the appropriate skills and the general lack of access to training. 
There is also ample evidence across Africa that SME owners find it difficult to 
access immediate and reliable information about business conditions and 
opportunities, which in turn hinders informed business decision making (Richter, 
2003:10). 
While there seems to be a similar degree of willingness to start a business 
regardless of education level, in South Africa, for instance, people with Matric or 
tertiary education are significantly more likely to start a new firm than those 
without Matric. Tertiary education certainly helps entrepreneurs to build a 
sustainable and long term business (Foxcroft, Wood, Kew, Herrington & Segal, 
2002:22). Mead (1998:7, as cited in Rogerson, 2001:121) argues that by virtue of 
undertaking some further education and training, entrepreneurs may, in fact, be 
better able to exploit market opportunities, especially where there is need for 
targeted capacity building. 
Any area where a cluster of firms has been established indicates the availability of 
a business opportunities. With the easier accessibility to information within 
clusters about products, services, and suppliers, perceived gaps that need filling 
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can be readily identified. The daily contact found among firms in incubators can 
be quite advantageous in this regard. Hence, because of the clustering of business 
activities individuals that see the gap and acquire the skills needed to set up a 
business. 
An entrepreneur that emerges out of an existing cluster already has established 
relationships, faces lower barriers to and risks of entry, and is likely to be aware of 
the potential customer base (Porter, 2000:24). Moreover, the entrepreneur can 
relatively easily gather the required manpower, skills, and production or service 
inputs. Besides attracting potential entrepreneurs from within the cluster, 
established entrepreneurs elsewhere will also be lured to relocate to such locations 
to establish themselves and exploit the opportunities presented by the cluster. This 
means that the cluster may end up benefiting from the rich experience coming 
with the migrant entrepreneurship.  
3.7 CLUSTERS AND INTER-FIRM NETWORKING 
Entrepreneurial activity thrives on the strength of social ties and networks. Hence, 
the impact of cultural differences due to ethnicity, religion, race and gender on 
entrepreneurial activity cannot be ignored. Africa is fraught with ethnic fights. 
The failure to form networks is often seen as a cultural issue responsible for the 
lack of social networks in African societies. Brautigam (2003:452) is of the view 
that African networks are weak because African businesses fail to rise above 
ethnic divisions. Meagher (2007:475) points to other researchers who argue that a 
cultural propensity to clientism, corruption, and communal conflict amongst 
African networks, where present, tends to stifle the establishment of rational 
economic institutions. The main assertion is that cultural embeddedness in Africa 
rather hinders collective efficiency than fosters it. 
Isolated and dispersed firms may network with each other, but to a lower extent 
compared to firms that are in close proximity. In a cluster of firms that usually 
have identical products or provide goods and services to identical markets, inter-
firm networks are easier to form. Through the sharing of information, associations 
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within clusters can also help disseminate reliable information that allows groups 
and communities to make efficient and appropriate decisions (Ostrom, 2000:198). 
Firms that take advantage of inter-firm relationships and networks benefit from 
the economies of agglomeration. Agglomeration economies involve minimisation 
of costs because of the sheer association with other firms. For example, Caniëls 
and Romijn (2001) stress that transaction costs are greatly reduced when a firm 
links up and networks with other firms; more so in a cluster setting. Localisation 
can indeed reduce costs of negotiating and monitoring contracts and costs attached 
to opportunistic behaviour (Enright & Roberts, 2001:69). While Schmitz and 
Nadvi (1999:1508) stress the lack of systematic attempts to quantify the influence 
of inter-firm cooperation on the performance of industrial clusters, it is still clear 
that greater local cooperation strengthens cluster performance. 
In societies where face-to-face communication is the norm, such as many African 
societies, inter-firm networks formed as a result of business clustering are 
especially relevant and perhaps more beneficial, because they foster joint action 
which leads to collective efficiency even amid cultural and ethnic differences. The 
main challenge in Africa, though, as Brautigam (2003) points out from existing 
research on African ethnic groupings, is whether the networks that are formed are 
the “right” ones for entrepreneurial endeavour. This may help to explain why 
cluster development programmes in the African context can be a daunting task. 
3.8 CLUSTERS AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SUPPORT 
The need for concerted and pro-active support by local governments for the small 
business sector is generally known and accepted. In the African context, however, 
two dilemmas interact: 
• low urbanisation levels imply that the bulk of the population lives in rural 
areas, which don’t even have municipalities, let alone capacities for 
municipal support action for SMEs; 
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• in the urban areas many of the urban government structures are extremely 
weak, given, i.a., a lack of regular local income, inadequate transfers from 
higher levels of government, lack of skilled officials and widespread 
corruption. 
Under these conditions we can hardly expect that local authorities will lead or 
initiate constructive and effective SME support programmes. In fact, the sequence 
has to be reversed: The creation and expansion of local clusters (initiated by other 
forces, like local resource development, new transport links or corporate projects) 
could be attractive for the local authority as a potential source of revenue or local 
employment. This could motivate the local authority to give more attention to this 
(new) growth force. 
Once local authorities realise the significance of such clustering, the door could 
open for constructive support action by the municipality for such local clustering. 
To succeed, much emphasis would have to be placed on partnership action 
(between the public and the private sector) and prodding by the business sector. 
Naturally, the larger and/or more diverse such local clustering, the greater the 
chances to influence local authorities towards pro-active, development supporting 
action. Such action can – and should – relate to: 
• local infrastructure developments (especially electricity, roads, refuse 
removal, security, water supply, postal services, etc.); 
• achieving appropriate levels of regulatory flexibility for local SMEs; 
• providing incentives for new SMEs in cluster-related subsectors. 
Rogerson (2001:124) points out that despite clusters not being seen as an outcome 
of deliberate state intervention, local government can facilitate the healthy 
development of clusters. For instance, it can provide infrastructure and a 
regulatory environment which is conducive for small firms. There is a logical 
argument as to why clusters can enhance state participation and support at the 
local level. Clusters, by nature, involve localised processes that are best 
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understood by local authorities who are in touch with the people, firms, and 
systems on the ground so much that interventions by local government are most 
likely to be well-targeted and effective at delivering services (OECD, 2004:32). 
Hence, if cluster development is placed within the jurisdiction of local municipal 
councils, it may even help to resuscitate ailing councils. Raines (2001) indeed 
finds that links between cluster policy and the development of local competitive 
advantages are stronger than with national competitive advantage. 
3.9 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has pointed out some of the general challenges that continue to 
ravage small enterprises and their development on the African continent. Major 
obstacles such as inadequate access to sources of finance, poor infrastructure, low 
urbanisation, and insufficient access to markets confine small businesses with 
limited growth prospects. 
Present interventions to the hurdles faced by SMEs in Africa fall short of the need 
of small enterprises. In theory cluster development programmes offer a span of 
solutions to many of the constraints to small business development. Where 
clusters have been employed in practice, whether via natural establishment or 
planned state efforts, they have shown great potential to enhance business 
development. Clusters of small businesses have the potential to drive regional 
development, to improve the competitiveness of regions, to encourage small 
business formation and to raise the export potential of firms. 
However, attempts at cluster development policy should bear in mind that every 
region is unique and must be tailored to meet the specific requirements of local 
industries. Simply put, because of the endogenous nature of regional cluster 
development, cluster strategies that worked in the Americas or European regions, 
for instance, should not be expected to work in Africa without appropriate 
adjustments. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
CLUSTER EXPERIENCES IN SOUTH AFRICA 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In many fields of African small business development, including the rationale of 
this research, South Africa provides an ideal environment from which case studies 
on small enterprise development can be useful to understand the African context. 
It portrays the best and the worst features of two disparate worlds, i.e. the First 
World and the Third World. At best, the country has a well-developed modern 
infrastructure and effectively functioning institutions while at worst it has high 
income inequality, huge unemployment and major challenges in the SME sector. 
It is estimated that 80 percent of small businesses in South Africa fail within the 
first five years. Amongst others, such statistics also call for the use of small 
business clustering as a tool for small business development. 
In this chapter we shall focus on South African cluster development, with the next 
chapter looking at examples in other African countries. 
Informal business activity clustering has existed in African societies for many 
years. Such informal clustering has been recorded in countries like Ghana and 
Kenya. More formal clusters like hives and incubators are a relatively novel idea 
to Africa. Despite the infancy of the small business incubation phenomenon in 
Africa, incubator programmes in South Africa have been active over the past three 
decades. Presently, the Small Enterprise Development Agency (SEDA) through 
its SEDA Technology Programme (STP) supports twenty nine incubators in 
different sectors across the country with the aim of strengthening small business 
support provided by various government departments and agencies (Ravjee, 
2010:3). The two cases used in this chapter, the Furniture Technology Centre 
Trust (Furntech) STP incubator group and the Witwatersrand clothing cluster are 
examples of small business clustering in South Africa. 
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This chapter compares and differentiates the performance of the two clusters in 
order to identify their strengths and weakness, especially in terms of achieving the 
main goal of clustering i.e. small business development. The exercise will also 
help to recognise cluster features that can improve cluster development policy. 
Ramluckan (2010) provides a summary of four main components of key 
performance indicators for an STP incubator performance assessment framework, 
namely: efficiency, effectiveness, utility, and sustainability. Evaluation of the 
Furntech incubator will be based on three of these concepts. Raines (2002) 
identifies the typical spatial development evaluation approaches which will be 
used to assess the Witwatersrand clothing cluster. Specifically, the evaluation 
focuses on the operational issues like the number of SMEs and jobs created 
through the clustering process. 
4.2 FURNITURE TECHNOLOGY CENTRE TRUST (FURNTECH) 
Furntech is one of the oldest sets of small business incubators, having the largest 
number of centres under the STP in South Africa. It has seven centres in both 
urban and rural areas countrywide: Cape Town and George in the Western Cape, 
Mthatha in the Eastern Cape, Umzimkhulu and Durban in KwaZulu Natal, 
Johannesburg in Gauteng and White River in Mpumalanga. All the centres have 
workshops which are fitted with advanced machinery (Ariefdien, 2011b). The 
Furntech incubator follows a rigidly structured modus operandi. In contrast, the 
Witwatersrand clothing cluster, which spans from the Inner City of Johannesburg 
into surrounding suburbs and townships has a far more flexible structure. 
According to Rogerson (2000:699-700), the cluster has facilities ranging from 
those with large modern machines to those with only home-based operations. 
The furniture industry is one of the largest low-tech sectors in the world. 
Production methods in the industry are labour-intensive, making it particularly 
attractive to developing countries which have high pools of unemployed labour. 
China is an example of such a developing country. In fact, China is a leading 
exporter of furniture, accounting for about 20 percent of global furniture exports 
(DTI, 2008:6). Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for less than 1 percent of global 
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furniture exports. To this small share of global exports, the South African 
furniture industry contributes 97 percent. 
The furniture industry in South Africa is part of the greater manufacturing sector. 
It contributed 1.6 percent to total manufacturing output in 2007 (IDC, 2008, as 
cited by DTI, 2008:8). Even though its contribution to aggregate GDP is low, it is 
an important industry since it can be one of the drivers of rural area development. 
The South African DTI recognises the potential held in this sector and has 
ventured to also provide sector support programmes in the furniture industry. The 
Furniture Technology Centre Trust, trading as Furntech, is one of the highly 
visible STP incubators in the country. It is a registered non-profit organisation. 
Furntech was launched in 2000. The DTI approved a 5-year funding plan to 
establish Furntech and the centre was required to be self-sustainable after that 
period (Mbewana, 2006:20). The first centre operated in George in 2001 with four 
units. Currently, Furntech has space to accommodate more than 70 clients in the 
abovementioned seven centres. Its objectives are stated as follows: 
• Facilitate the development and growth of start-ups and existing SMEs in the 
furniture sector; 
• Operate and manage an effective and efficient administration system for 
clients; 
• Facilitate the creation of wealth and jobs through the incubation  
programme; 
• Facilitate access to professional services like business planning, funding and 
marketing; 
• Provide technical skills development at a subsidised rate to the incubatees; 
• Establish satellite centres that will enable Furntech to extend the full range 
of services on a national basis; 
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• Create awareness of new technologies through technology demonstration; 
and 
• Become a world class Centre of Sectoral and Occupational Excellence. 
Furntech provides support to both existing and start-up businesses through the 
incubation facilities The Furntech incubation model is designed to help existing 
and potential entrepreneurs and small businesses withstand the challenges faced in 
the early stages of developing and growing their business. The model incorporates 
skills training and business development processes as well as infrastructure 
development (Furntech Annual Report, 2011:9).  
Furntech has standardised its systems and operations with respect to the layout 
and type of machinery in the workshops across the seven centres. A tour around 
the Cape Town centre located in the industrial area of Paarden Eiland allowed the 
researcher to inspect the workshop and training facilities and the surrounding area. 
The facilities in the centre are modern and advanced. In fact, most small firms 
would not be able to afford such tools and equipment on their own. 
Aside from its equipment and the provision of training, the incubator also offers 
mentorship and assistance in critical business areas like human resource 
management and financial management. It furthermore provides linkages to 
relevant networks through which firms can access suppliers, business support 
service providers, and government tenders. Above all that, it gives post-incubation 
services to graduating firms. 
The incubatees are involved in a wide array of furniture manufacturing and wood 
production activities. Many of the furniture products at Furntech are essential, 
high utility wooden goods including chairs, tables, office and school desks, 
cupboards and cabinets, window frames, doors, and coffins (Furntech Annual 
Report, 2011).  
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4.2.1 Furntech urban centres 
There is a Furntech centre located in each of three major South African cities: 
Cape Town, Durban, and Johannesburg. The Cape Town and Durban centres were 
both launched in 2004 while the Johannesburg centre was launched four years 
later in 2008 (www.furntech.org.za). The Cape Town centre, which is also the 
head office, has 8 incubation units while the Durban and Johannesburg centres 
have 14 and 16 units, respectively (Ariefdien, 2011a; Furntech Annual Report, 
2010; Furntech Annual Report, 2011).  
At first glance the urban centres are expected to possess certain advantages over 
the rural ones because differences in regional dynamics invariably bring forth 
differences in opportunities and challenges faced. Regional differences and the 
corresponding differences in opportunities and challenges faced in the different 
regions are not detailed in the paper as the sources used do not distinguish cluster 
performance between urban and rural regions. However, it is clear from the 
research that feasibility studies conducted for cluster development policy can 
benefit from a comprehensive understanding of the differences. 
On closer inspection, the urban centres do in fact stand at an elevated vantage 
point, compared to the rural ones as they have access to better physical 
infrastructure, can source production inputs quicker, are closer to the market, and 
generally have staff with higher levels of education (Ariefdien, 2011a). In 
addition, the provision of water and sanitation to people living in close proximity, 
as well as access to health, education, and many other social and cultural services, 
are all more manageable (www.worldbank.org). Hence, a proper understanding of 
regional differences is important for cluster development policy formulation. 
4.2.2 Furntech rural centres 
Furntech has four rural centres: the George centre launched in 2002, the White 
River and Umzimkhulu centres launched in 2004, and the latest centre added in 
Mthatha in 2009 (www.furntech.org.za). The George centre currently has only 4 
incubation units and there are 10 in White River, 22 in Umzimkhulu (including 10 
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for post-incubation purposes) and 15 in Mthatha (Ariefdien, 2011a; Furntech 
Annual Report, 2010; Furntech Annual Report, 2011).  
All the centres, except Mthatha, were established after their viability was verified. 
The Mthatha centre was formed due to political intervention, despite the uncertain 
feasibility of locating in this relatively remote area (Ariefdien, 2011a). The 
business incubator manager pointed out that 9 out of the 20 new small businesses 
created in that centre have since closed down. He also notes that the Umzimkhulu 
centre is struggling as one big challenge of locating in the rural areas is access to 
raw materials. But, even where raw materials are readily available and accessible, 
other problems of the rural centres include poor access to intermediate inputs, like 
nails and bolts, higher costs of transporting inputs and outputs, low education and 
skills levels of local staff, limited local demand for the products, and a lack of 
support from local municipalities. 
4.2.3 Incubation processes 
Since Furntech is in the furniture industry, it has a particular target market. The 
Furntech business technology incubation (BTI) process caters for entrepreneurs or 
job seekers with an interest in woodworking and furniture manufacturing and with 
some experience in running and managing a business. They include both start-ups 
and existing SMEs in the woodworking and furniture manufacturing industry and 
allow individuals already working in the furniture manufacturing and 
woodworking industry as employees, who want to start their own business. The 
incubation process is a structured five-step procedure. 
The first step involves a meeting between the aspiring or existing business owner 
and the Furntech centre manager. At this meeting, the two parties discuss the 
business idea and what the incubation process entails. In this initial stage, the 
business owner is required to submit a completed generic application form, a 
curriculum vitae, a business and marketing plan, and a certified copy of the 
identity document. In the second phase, the applicants go through a three-month 
screening process where their commitment and skills are assessed. During this 
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period their applications are evaluated by the Furntech National Incubation 
Committee. The committee makes recommendations about the successful 
applications. The approved applicants then go through to the third stage, where 
goals are set and agreed upon and firms are then admitted into the incubation 
programme in one of the Furntech centres (www.furntech.org.za). 
The firms then enter into a contract (step four) to be in incubation for two years 
(with extension to 3 years considered). Within this period their performance is 
monitored and they receive business support services as well as technical support. 
The contract also binds the incubatee to pay over 10 percent of its monthly 
turnover to the incubator. There is a minimum amount to be paid if the small 
enterprise has a turnover below that threshold. Each enterprise is expected to 
adhere to the conditions in its contract, with failure to do so leading to contract 
termination. 
The two-year incubation period used by Furntech is not based on a scientifically 
determined time required for a small or medium enterprise to stabilise and be able 
to circumvent the obstacles affecting a new business. Ariefdien (2011b) makes it 
clear that the incubation timeframe is linked to the funding provided by the DTI 
through SEDA. The DTI will only fund the incubator to support incubatees for a 
two-year period. If the firms exceed two years, then the incubator must find other 
sources of funding to continue supporting them, even though it takes five to seven 
years for small businesses to properly stabilise. 
Finally, after the incubation period the enterprise graduates (or must graduate). 
The fifth phase is a post-graduation period where the graduating firms may still 
make use of the incubator equipment and services, but from outside the physical 
incubator premises. Yet, Ariefdien (2011b) concedes that capacity and financial 
constraints have made it difficult for Furntech to have a formal follow-up system 
to monitor firms after they graduate. This can be seen by the fact that it does not 
have clear records of how many firms have continued operating or closed down 
after graduating. Therefore post-incubation support is hard to measure. 
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4.2.4 Incubator performance 
Ramluckan (2010) conducted a useful study on twenty STP incubators in South 
Africa, including Furntech. In this study, he assessed incubator performance using 
an incubator performance assessment framework compiled from other studies on 
small enterprise incubators. He adapted four key criteria used in a CSES report 
which he broke down into smaller measurable performance indicators. 
The four CSES approaches for incubator best practice are efficiency, 
effectiveness, utility, and sustainability. The CSES Benchmarking Framework 
defines efficiency in terms of how cost effective the provision of incubator 
services is, when matched against incubator outputs. Effectiveness is the extent to 
which an incubator achieves key operational targets. Utility refers to the degree to 
which firms use the incubator and sustainability is the extent to which the 
operating costs of an incubator are covered by its income, i.e. sustainability of 
operations and durability of attained outcomes (CSES, 2002a:26). 
The preceding definitions allow for the identification of commonly used 
performance evaluation metrics. This research employs incubator-level analysis 
by comparing measures on an annual basis. Thus, only incubator-specific 
measures will be used to evaluate incubator performance. To measure incubator 
effectiveness, the recognised metrics are the number of new SMEs created, the 
number of new projects initiated, the number of new direct and indirect jobs 
created, and the number of graduating SMEs. Incubator utility will be assessed by 
using the occupancy rate of the incubator. For sustainability, the units of 
measurement are the ratio of income generated from operations to cost incurred 
during operations, the incubator’s reliance on external funding captured by means 
of its financial leverage, and the graduation rates.  
A job is direct when it is created within the incubatee firm itself and indirect when 
it is a result of the firm’s involvement in the local supply chain. An occupancy 
rate is calculated as the ratio between the number of tenants and the number of 
available units in the incubator. Financial leverage, in this case, is the ratio of 
 
 
 
 
40 
public to private sector funding for the incubator while the graduation rate is 
calculated as a percentage of tenants leaving the incubator each year. 
Furntech aggregates impact survey results for all the centres as shown in Table 4.1 
below. 
Table 4.1: Effectiveness indicators of Furntech BTI 
Year Measurement 
 No. of new 
SMEs 
created 
No. of new 
projects 
initiated 
No. of jobs 
(direct) 
created 
No. of jobs 
(indirect) 
created 
No. of SMEs 
graduating 
2001/2002 2     
2002/2003 9     
2003/2004 9     
2004/2005 22     
2005/2006 17     
2006/2007 14 12 42 89 0 
2007/2008 34 22 64 148 17 
2008/2009 32 29 76 160 9 
2009/2010 36 32 133 285 8 
2010/2011 28 80 42 113 7 
Total 
2006-2011 
203 
144 175 357 795 41 
Average 
2006-2011 
20 
29 35 71 159 8 
Source: Furntech Annual Reports 2006-2011; www.furntech.org.za 
The period under analysis is 2006 to 2011, given the availability of information. 
We can briefly comment on these results. 
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Firstly, in terms of jobs from the BTI, both those created directly and indirectly, 
rose over four of the five periods reviewed. The 2010/2011 phase shows a decline 
in the number of jobs created. There is a spike in the 2009/2010 period where 
direct job creation rises by 75 percent and indirect jobs established rise by about 
44 percent from 2008/2009. But in the 2010/2011 period, the creation of direct 
jobs falls by 68%, almost offsetting the previous rise while the fall of 60 percent 
for indirect jobs created totally offsets the rise in the preceding period. The rise 
can in part be attributed to the launching of the Mthatha centre in 2009 although 
its magnitude seems to defy the presence of a recession at the time. In fact, the fall 
in job creation observed in 2010 could be due to the lagged effect of the crisis. 
Figure 4.1: Number of SMEs created in Furntech BTI (2001-2011) 
Number of SMEs created in Furntech BTI (2001-2011)
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Source: Furntech Annual Report 2011 
Figure 4.1 shows that through its Business Technology Incubation, Furntech has 
been creating an increasing number of SMEs since its inception in 2001. This is 
expected because the incubator has expanded from one to seven centres in the ten 
years. For the five years under review, though, there have been fluctuations, albeit 
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consistently at a relatively higher level on average than in the earlier five periods 
of the incubator’s existence. 
There is an increasing trend in the number of new projects initiated in the 
Furntech BTI as can be seen in Figure 4.2 below. As explained earlier, the sharp 
rise between the 2009/2010 and 2010/2011 can be linked to the launch of the 
Mthatha centre in 2009. 
Figure 4.2: Number of new projects initiated in Furntech BTI (2006-2011) 
Number of new projects initiated in Furntech BTI (2006-2011)
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Source: Furntech Annual Report 2011 
Figure 4.3 depicts the number of SMEs graduating from the Furntech BTI. In the 
short term while the incubatees are still under incubation, it is expected that an 
incubator will effectively assist these fledgling firms by ensuring a favourable 
environment. However, this may not be a good measure of an incubator’s 
effectiveness. One measure that represents the long term effectiveness of an 
incubator is the number of SMEs that are “graduating” from its immediate care. 
Figure 4.3 shows falling numbers of graduates from the BTI. Yet, using the 
graduation rate, i.e. the rate of graduates from the incubator relative to the number 
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of tenants, shows more stability (16% for 2008). Notwithstanding the latter, long 
term effectiveness of the Furntech BTI still comes into question. 
Figure 4.3: Number of SMEs graduating from Furntech BTI (2006-2011) 
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Source: Furntech Annual Report 2011 
On average, the occupancy rate of the Furntech BTI stands at around 65 percent 
for the period 2006/2007 and 2010/2011. At such a rate, the facility is certainly 
under-utilised. What is more, the rate has been falling for the last three periods, 
given the increases in the available incubation units. This sharply falling rate 
means that there are fewer firms utilising the BTI facility recently. 
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Figure 4.4: Occupancy Rates at Furntech BTI Centres (2006-2011) 
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Source: Furntech Annual Report 2011 
Looking at the financial side, income from the operating activities of Furntech 
(including tenant rental fees) have, on average, only been able to cover 
approximately 17 percent of the cost of these operations. For the first three years 
(2006-2009), the continuous fall from 26 percent to 8 percent (see Figure 4.5) of 
the ratio of operating income to operating cost indicates that the incubator’s 
ability to finance its own operations became much weaker. In this context, 
Ariefdien (2011b) boldly stated that no incubator programme has the ability to be 
self-sustaining. 
Invariably this implies that external funding must be found in order to sustain the 
operations of the incubator, which is, indeed, the case for Furntech. In fact, 
according to Ariefdien (2011b), Furntech is the only STP incubator that is not 
entirely funded by the government. His statement is consistent with the annual 
reports, as summarised in Figure 4.6. It shows that the bulk of, but not the total 
funding, comes from the state. There does, however, appear to be a steady rise in 
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the government share of the funding, from a 3.49 factor in 2006/7 to a 5.19 factor 
in 2009/10 and 4.16 in 2010/2011. 
As indicated earlier, another measure of sustainability, the graduation rate, has 
been low but stable, particularly over the last three years. However, this stability 
should be interpreted with caution because as the number of graduating firms was 
falling so too was the number of tenants in the BTI. 
Figure 4.5: Ratio of operating income to operating cost (2006-2011) 
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Source: Furntech Annual Reoirt, 2011 
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Figure 4.6: Ratio of public funding to private funding (2006-2011) 
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Source: Furntech Annual Report 2011 
The above critical findings are based on quantifiable measures of incubator 
performance. Yet, some unquantifiable features may be useful to holistically 
capture incubator performance. For example, it is clear from the interviewed 
incubator manager at the head office in Cape Town and from recorded accounts of 
some incubatee experiences in the annual reports, that the Furntech BTI 
programme provides several useful incubation services to the enterprises. 
However, the quality of the services offered during and after incubation is not 
stated and thus remains unclear. On the other hand, since the Furntech vocational 
skills training programme is registered with the South African Department of 
Higher Education and Training and is also accredited by the South African Forest 
Industries Education and Training Authority and the Tibro Training Centre in 
Sweden, it is reasonable to conclude that the standard of training meets the 
minimum requirements at the very least. 
Another intangible characteristic of incubator performance is how it is managed 
and the quality of the incubator management. Furntech has an organisational 
 
 
 
 
47 
structure which means that it follows a particular hierarchy of governance and 
management and has different business units. It has a board of trustees, a chief 
executive officer, and incubator centre managers. Thus, Furntech is well 
organised, which makes it possible for responsibility and accountability to be 
traced and maintained. This study did, however, not attempt to measure the 
quality of the management. 
4.2.5 Overall evaluation of Furntech 
For reasons primarily related to the availability of data, we selected the furniture-
industry related Furntech incubator group as example of a rigid system of clusters 
in South Africa. The data revealed a number of these sector-focused incubators 
spread across both urban and rural areas in the country. The individual incubators 
were of modest size, with a relatively disappointingly low occupancy level. 
Over the five years, for which detailed information was available, the graduation 
rate – generally put at two years of occupancy with comprehensive support – was 
also relatively low. Due to the relatively small size of the enterprises the overall 
rate of job creation was also rather modest. 
Compared to these performance ratios, the cost of the programme was substantial 
and increased annually. In sharp contrast, the rate of dependency on public 
funding increased over the years, viz. the contribution from incubates was very 
modest. 
Thus, viewed in macro-context, the Furntech incubator group cannot be regarded 
as macro-economically significant or financially sustainable. Yet, it is widely 
regarded as one of the better managed, rigid incubator sets in South Africa. It is 
also one which incorporates relatively modern and sophisticated units and more 
basic, rural sector-related units. As such, it is in sharp contrast to the modern 
technology-focused incubators, which receive much attention in the US/Western 
European literature. 
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4.3 WITWATERSRAND CLOTHING CLUSTER 
The Witwatersrand is one of three areas in South Africa with a highly active 
clothing sector. The others are the Western Cape and the Durban urban area. As at 
the middle of 2004, the Gauteng region made up a quarter of the clothing firms in 
South Africa, with 239 out of the total of 827 found around that locality. The 
Western Cape and KwaZulu Natal accounted for 327 and 219, respectively 
(Barnes, 2005:5). Since then, South Africa’s clothing suffered intensively under 
increased global competition, but the regional pattern remained the same. 
During the apartheid era, South Africa’s clothing industry was heavily protected 
through import substitution. Hence, the clothing sector was mainly driven by 
domestic demand. Predictably, upon opening up to international markets the 
industry struggled to compete with countries that can produce clothing at lower 
cost. Consequently, clothing imports have risen sharply in the country over the 
years. For example, Barnes (2005:7) indicates that imports rose by 58 percent 
between 2003 and 2004. Because of this precarious position, clustering was 
identified as one possible way of mitigating the effects of global competition. The 
Cape Clothing Cluster and the KZN Clothing and Textiles Cluster are examples of 
efforts instituted at the provincial level (Barnes, 2005:10). 
This section draws extensively on the work of Rogerson (2000) who conducted a 
thorough study of a particular clustering example in South Africa, viz. the 
Witwatersrand clothing cluster in the Gauteng province. His main aim was to 
identify the determinants of successful development of clothing and textile SMEs 
in that region. As he points out, research on enterprise clustering in South Africa 
was still very limited when he carried out his research (Rogerson, 2000:691). 
Much of this is still true today, since few detailed studies have to date been done 
on African enterprise clustering, despite its growing importance to African 
economic development. 
Even though the period under investigation by Rogerson is different, the 
Witwatersrand clothing cluster case is relevant to our present study as an example 
of a relatively flexible cluster. Firstly, the clothing industry, like the furniture 
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industry, is part of the greater manufacturing sector in South Africa. It is also a 
relatively low-tech industry and employs labour-intensive methods of production. 
In 2004, the sector contributed 1.8 percent to total employment in South Africa 
and up to 13.4 percent of total manufacturing employment. Firms in the clothing 
sector range from large factories to home-based operators. Hence, the clothing 
industry is also crucial for South Africa because it can help to deal with, inter alia, 
the high unemployment and poverty in the country. 
Parallel to the sharp rise in the imports of low cost clothing and textile products 
(primarily from China and other Asean countries), South Africa’s own clothing 
exports were dampened when the United States ended the quota system on 
China’s exports to the USA. This had been part of the protective action under the 
African Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA) instituted to strengthen African 
economic development around the turn of the century. 
Thus, the background to the study by Rogerson is a South African textile and 
apparel sector which faces tough international competition, both in the local 
markets and with respect to exports. It is in that context that sector-focused 
incubators could play a significant role. 
Rogerson’s (2000) study does not explain the exact origin of the Witwatersrand 
cluster, but the author mentions the origins of selected firms in the cluster and 
briefly refers to the history of racial discrimination through legislation like the 
Environmental Planning Act in which black workers were prohibited from 
working in the Witwatersrand area. Although those policies dampened the formal 
clothing industry in the area, its core remained resilient. This included a dynamic 
and resurgent informal clothing industry, upon which the study concentrates. The 
emerging entrepreneurship in the cluster was largely a result of factors related to 
the size and growth of market demand for clothing in the region and beyond. After 
all, the presence of market opportunities is usually a precondition for successful 
enterprise development. 
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Rogerson (2000) focused on a sample of 27 enterprises from the cluster. Each of 
the selected enterprises had to have been operating for more than two years and 
had to be classified as SMEs. Twelve firms from the sample were established 
between 1990 and 1998, 11 firms had started between 1970 and 1989 with one of 
the remaining four having started before 1959 (Rogerson, 2000:701). Twenty five 
of the 27 were small enterprises and only two were medium-sized firms. Thirty 
one enterprise owners, most of whom were renting premises in inner-city 
Johannesburg, were interviewed. The interviews covered education and training of 
the entrepreneur, their work experience, the history of enterprise formation, the 
growth of the enterprise, and inter-firm linkages with other enterprises. This was 
done in order to profile the development of the Witwatersrand clothing cluster. 
With such information the researcher would be in a position to identify the drivers 
of successful SMEs in the cluster. 
The study revealed that 21 of the enterprises were new start-ups compared to 6 
that were intergenerational family businesses. The majority of the enterprises were 
initiated as a consequence of perceived market opportunities while a few were 
cases of “forced or necessity entrepreneurship”, i.e. the entrepreneur starts a 
business not because of an existing business opportunity but due to lack of a 
source of sustenance, for example a job or because of retrenchment. This is an 
important observation, because the entrepreneurial pool in South Africa has been 
estimated to contain 42 percent “necessity entrepreneurs” (Foxcroft et al., 
2002:14), which partly explains why so many start-ups fail within the first two to 
five years.  
The enterprises in the cluster were involved in very diverse clothing 
manufacturing activities, ranging from high utility clothing products (commonly 
including school uniforms and corporate clothing wear) to jerseys, golf shirts, 
trousers, skirts, and many other types. The interviewees indicated that they had 
started out with very basic clothing designs and diversified into more complex 
styles over time. For Rogerson (2000:699), such changes suggested that firms 
were gradually pursuing more profitable niches. Moreover, it also showed the 
influence of technology diffusion as firms used better equipment and learned from 
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each other. They became more accustomed to existing and new machinery and 
were consequently able to produce better goods. 
Regarding job creation, the research showed that the Witwatersrand cluster was 
indeed quite effective. It was found that since their start, a total of 800 direct jobs 
had been created in the 27 firms sampled from the clothing cluster. Each of the 25 
small firms employed between 5 and 50 workers compared to between 70 and 200 
workers employed in the two medium-sized firms. The cluster aided the growth of 
enterprises through the expanding asset base of the firms. The more “successful” 
enterprises had managed to significantly grow their asset base relative to the 
initial asset holding. The study revealed that three of the biggest entrepreneurs 
each held assets to the value of over R1million. There is clear evidence that the 
firms in the cluster grew and expanded, given that 18 of them had reported start-
up assets valued at less than R10 000. 
With respect to education and training levels, most of the firm owners were found 
to have at least some elementary education. Yet, few of them had trained to 
acquire the technical skills needed in clothing production. Those who had any 
business-related training were even fewer; only four of them had studied anything 
associated with small business management. Most had learnt by “doing” and 
through work experience. In this context, a study by Foxcroft et al. on 
entrepreneurship in South Africa adds impetus to the preceding point, as it was 
found that although an adult with tertiary education was more likely to own a long 
term business, education, in general, had an insignificant effect on the probability 
of an individual being involved in a start-up (Foxcroft et al., 2002:24). 
The study also revealed that, where an enterprise locates its operating premises 
has an important bearing on its survival. The Witwatersrand study found that all 
the interviewees had relocated from their initial premises. Although half of them 
had started operating from formally rented spaces, 19 of the 27 participants 
stressed the importance of having their own premises in properly located areas. 
Moreover, one entrepreneur who had an experience with a SBDC hive expressed 
displeasure with the infrastructure provided by the hive, citing that it was more of 
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a hindrance to business than a benefit. This can be linked to Thomas (2009:10) 
who explained that the SBDC hives were usually located in old buildings, with the 
particular location not necessarily close to markets. 
Besides factors and action related to the individual entrepreneurs, the study also 
showed that the influence of joint action in a cluster scenario cannot be ignored. 
Thus, the entrepreneurs in the sample acknowledged the significance of being in 
close proximity with other clothing-related firms. Indeed, firms were engaging in 
joint action by using each other’s basic equipment and sharing raw materials in 
times of shortage. Other examples of joint action included businesses who were 
subcontracting amongst each other, jointly marketing products and linking up with 
street traders. Market information sharing was commonly done via ethnic or racial 
networks, which was understandable since the cluster was located in a region that 
had been a target for racially motivated policies in the past. 
We can end this brief review of the example of a flexible, sector-focused cluster in 
the Witwatersrand by a few conclusions, which also contrast this case with the 
rigid Furntech incubator as well as the flexible clustering through hives, which 
was covered in an earlier chapter. 
• The textile and apparel industry is a good example of the potential for SME-
clustering in the economic development process, given the breadth and 
diversity of activities, the large and growing market for such goods and the 
vast scope for informal and micro-enterprise activities. 
• The Witwatersrand cluster was even more flexible than the hives, since the 
enterprises each had their own accommodation and there was no overall 
organisational structure. Thus, basically the extent of cooperation was left to 
the firms to decide and act upon. 
• The evolution of the Witwatersrand cluster revealed that locational 
proximity of the firms was an important factor, even though there was no 
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attempt to locate at one physical location. In fact, the flexibility increased 
the scope for individual firms to arrange the best deal. 
• Over the years the cluster partners developed various linkages and helped 
each other in different ways. This may not have been as intensive as 
envisaged in incubators or hives, but it could adapt to individual needs and 
capabilities. 
• The study didn’t reveal in any detail support provided by public sector 
bodies, NGOs or other institutions to address the problems of entrepreneurs. 
Here the gap between (well-functioning) incubators and such loose clusters 
is the greatest. Yet, at the same time the loose clusters constituted no 
specific financial burden on the public sector. 
The Witwatersrand cluster could, in current terminology, also be viewed as a 
“virtual hive”, i.e. a voluntary clustering of sector-specific firms who benefit from 
different types of cooperative action. Such action could be complemented by 
different types of targeted public sector support and other types of joint action. 
This could include the negotiation of specific financing packages, the arrangement 
(with a training body) of special training programmes and other supportive action 
adapted to the industry. Many of these activities might not need public funds. 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
Out of the wide range of flexible as well as rigid clusters existing in South Africa, 
this chapter selected one formal incubator set (in the furniture industry) and one 
flexible clustering group (in the textile and apparel sector). In addition we referred 
earlier to the South African experience with (ex-SBDC) hives. 
More detailed surveys of these examples show the complexity of each project and 
the many problems or challenges experienced or likely to arise. The financial and 
managerial challenges are greatest in the formal incubators, but so are the 
opportunities to provide systematic and consistent support. In the virtual clusters 
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the financial risk is lowest, but the scope for systematic support is limited, since it 
largely depends on the initiatives of the members. 
It is clear from the above that in the developed, industrialised countries the 
emphasis falls on formal, tightly managed and designed incubators where the 
spread of new technologies or the close interaction of firms is vital and where the 
public sector is able to fund the cost. In sharp contrast, developing countries may 
lack the funds for such sophisticated incubators and their emerging enterprise 
clusters may be best served with much looser arrangements. These issues will be 
covered in the next two chapters. 
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CHAPTER 5: 
CLUSTERING EXPERIENCES FROM OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Some other African countries, besides South Africa, are also familiar with 
informal and formal clustering efforts. This section considers a few documented 
accounts of incubation and other clustering experiences specifically focusing on 
Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and Zambia. It briefly highlights the history of clustering 
in these countries and how government policy, if any, has sought to influence the 
process. 
5.2 GHANA 
Ghana has one of the more developed emerging economies in Africa with 
favourable conditions to harness entrepreneurship. Its economic structure 
resembles those of many other countries on the continent with some large 
companies, large numbers of small and medium enterprises and a vast array of 
micro- and informal enterprises (Robson, Haugh & Obeng, 2009). The country 
has a relatively more stable economic and political climate and an established rule 
of law. Yet, although the state has shown commitment to promoting 
entrepreneurship and small enterprise development in Ghana, SMEs especially in 
the industrial sector, are still at pains to survive because the sector is generally 
structurally weak and unbalanced (UNCTAD, 2005:57). The industrial sector has 
limited linkages to other sectors in the economy and the few large firms in the 
sector have negligible linkages to SMEs. 
Notwithstanding this general lack of industrial sector clustering, one of the largest 
flexible clusters in Ghana and the whole West African region in terms of the 
number of enterprises is the Suame cluster, which appears to be providing its 
more than 10 000 small enterprises with the needed environment to survive and 
thrive. The cluster, located in the large city of Kumasi, consists of firms related to 
metalworking and vehicle repairing. It has been widely and thoroughly 
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researched. For example, McCormick (1999) investigates its contribution to the 
level of industrialisation in the area; Oyelaran-Oyeyinka and Lal (2006) use data 
from the cluster to analyse how institutional infrastructure and collective learning 
influence the adoption of new technology; and Iddrisu, Mano and Sonobe (2011) 
attempted to establish if entrepreneurial skills are a major determinant of 
enterprise performance and development in the cluster. 
As shown by these three studies, the Suame cluster has existed for some time and 
is effectively aiding enterprise development in that sector. The cluster grew from 
about 8 000 firms in 2000 to almost 12 000 in 2003 (Idrissu et al., 2011:4), with a 
50 percent growth in turnover within three years. This growth and other trends 
suggest that the cluster is fostering the entrepreneurial spirit in that part of Ghana. 
Other examples of successful flexible clusters could be cited, but the overall 
conclusion is clear: flexible clusters exist in several places and with the focus on 
different sectors. These are, however, not the tightly organised incubators nor the 
flexible hives, but the loose clustering of related enterprises in specific geographic 
areas. The same applies to public sector support, which is generally of an ad hoc 
nature and not closely integrated as in incubator programmes. 
5.3 KENYA 
According to Moyi and Njiraini (2005:29), business incubation in Kenya has its 
roots in the late 1960s when the Industrial and Commercial Development 
Corporation (ICDC) introduced the Kenya Industrial Estates (KIE). The objective 
was to provide indigenous Kenyan enterprises with infrastructure and financial 
support to enter the manufacturing sector and to grow. The KIE had established 
28 industrial estates with a total of 414 industrial workspaces by 1999 (Moyi & 
Njiraini, 2005:40). The small firms were allowed to utilise the facilities for five 
years after which they had to leave. The results show that the KIE also 
encountered some of the typical problems. In particular, the allocation of 
workspaces to tenants has been subject to political interference which negatively 
affected the initial mission of incubation. Moreover, the structure of the estates 
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became bureaucratic “with highly centralised functions and costly service centres, 
rendering its services less effective” (Moyi & Njiraini, 2005:41). 
In their research on incubation in Kenya, Meru and Struwig (2011) assessed the 
perceptions of 124 entrepreneurs about the importance of business incubation and 
how those entrepreneurs who received the services rendered by the incubator 
viewed such services. They also looked at 12 incubators of which 10 were not 
state-owned. They found that the entrepreneurs saw business incubation services 
as highly significant, yet in the end they actually received fewer services from 
incubation than what they had expected to receive (Meru & Struwig, 2011:118). 
The authors attribute this gap between perception and reality to the nature of 
private incubators, whose pursuit of profit reduced the quality of service delivery. 
This seems a plausible conclusion, although a counterfactual study in which more 
of the government owned incubators are investigated could help to distinguish the 
effects of the profit motive on incubator service delivery. 
On flexible enterprise clusters in Kenya, McCormick (1999) provides insights into 
four Kenyan clusters: Eastlands garments in the clothing industry, Kimukunji in 
metal products, Ziwani in vehicle repairs, and Lake Victoria in fish processing. 
Improved market access was seen to be the major benefit derived by firms in these 
clusters. She also noticed some intermediate input effects amongst the enterprises, 
especially in the Ziwani cluster (McCormick, 1999:1544). On the other hand, she 
found very weak pooling of specialised skills in the clusters. Such pooling is 
likely to occur when the cluster attracts entrepreneurs with the best skills for the 
particular industry into a specific location, thus achieving benefits from 
technological spillovers. On the other hand, the diffusion of technological 
expertise and information is very limited in clusters where the firms engage in 
trade, which requires only basic technology (McCormick, 1999:1544). 
Except for the Ziwani cluster, all the flexible clusters did not have any 
institutionalised joint action, either horizontally, vertically, bilaterally, or 
multilaterally (McCormick, 1999:1544). Thus, firms informally worked together 
without any association or cooperative to handle their affairs. This means, for 
 
 
 
 
58 
example, that should a conflict arise between firms, there was no formal 
intervention to help resolve it. 
Mitullah (1998) acknowledges the importance of sector-focused business 
associations when she uses some Kenyan fishing clusters to explore the 
proposition that the key to clustering success lies in the collective efficiency 
derived from the interactions amongst resident firms. Her analysis, however, 
offers a useful caveat on collective efficiency: it can be achieved if individual 
interests of all relevant parties in a cluster succumb to group interests and if the 
influence of unequal power relations in a cluster is curbed. 
5.4 NIGERIA 
Sriram and Mersha (2010) estimate that as much as 95 percent of manufacturing 
in Nigeria in 2005 was attributable to SMEs. Without doubt, they are major 
players in the Nigerian economy, where the unstructured, locational clustering of 
small enterprises has played a significant role in the business development 
process. 
Adegbite (2001) presents one of the few studies conducted on incubation in 
Nigeria. He reviews the implementation of incubator programmes in the country 
indicating outstanding strengths and weaknesses. His study included the country’s 
seven existing incubators which he categorised into two broad groups, namely 
industrial business incubators and technology business incubators. The intention 
of developing the incubators was mainly to stimulate the growth of SMEs. 
The study found that the four industrial incubators were all relatively ineffective 
as far as creating a steady flow of thriving enterprises was concerned (Adegbite, 
2001:160). Some tenants were more or less permanently in “incubation”, in some 
cases for up to over 20 years. This makes the “hive tenants” in the South African 
terminology, rather than incubatees. None of the incubators was self-sustaining, 
relying quite heavily on government aid. On the whole, they were poorly managed 
under bureaucratic government supervision. The three technology incubators also 
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encountered the problem of tenants who were unwilling to move out after the 
prescribed incubation period. The technology incubators were also unable to 
generate adequate operational income to cover running costs, which increased 
their dependence on the state. 
Agboli and Ukaegbu (2006) examined the business environment in southeast 
Nigeria, focusing on four informal clusters located in Aba, Nnewi, Onitsha and 
Umuahia. These flexible clusters consisted of a range of enterprises from micro to 
large ones. Most of the firms in the clusters were involved in manufacturing 
activities of different types. Overall, it was found that the business environment 
for both nascent and existing SMEs is very daunting. The researchers 
hypothesised that entrepreneurs in Nigeria face greater infrastructure difficulties 
than administrative and regulatory problems (Agboli & Ukaegbu, 2006:25). In 
general, the government was not fulfilling its role to provide an enabling 
environment for the clusters, especially with respect to the necessary 
infrastructure. However, there were also instances where the firms did not take 
advantage of existing facilities and services within the cluster environment to ease 
some of the challenges they meet. 
Over the past few years interest in cluster development strategies and incubator 
development in Nigeria has increased rapidly, given the challenges of rapid 
urbanisation, rising income levels and consumer spending and the need to create 
employment opportunities. This study has not been able to look closer at that 
complex process and what it means for the development of clusters and 
incubators. Yet, it seems relevant to mention that a Nigerian banker, Anderson 
Nwosu, is currently doing PhD-research on clustering and public-private 
partnerships in Nigeria at the University of Stellenbosch Business School. 
 
5.5 ZAMBIA 
Until the early 1990s, private enterprise in Zambia had been marginalised due to 
the socialist approach to economic development. Thus, there was little scope for 
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pro-active entrepreneurship promotion in the Zambian economy. According to 
Hyman, Strauss, and Crayne (1993:103), parastatals were a characteristic feature 
of the country’s economy and the subsidised competition they offered, coupled 
with hostile government policy, choked the little private enterprise existing at the 
time. Furthermore, the economy was fairly closed to external competition and it 
was heavily reliant on copper exports. 
Despite small enterprises being sidelined in the past, an entrepreneurial spirit was 
still evident in Zambia (Beveridge & Oberschall, 1979, as cited by Hyman et al., 
1993). The government eventually recognised the importance of SMEs to 
economic growth and prosperity. Its initial attempt to harness the SME sector was 
the institution of the Small Industries Development Organisation (SIDO) through 
the Small Industries Development (SID) Act of 1981 (Ministry of Commerce, 
Trade and Industry (MCTI), 2008). SIDO was mandated to, among other things, 
formulate, coordinate, and implement national policies and programmes relating 
to small enterprises. It was to provide extension and management services to small 
enterprises and to assist them in developing industrial estates and common-facility 
centres (business incubators) (Hyman et al., 1993:105). 
The advent of a democratic political regime after 1991 brought about a further 
liberalisation of the economy. Opening up the markets ensured that the private 
sector was allowed room to manoeuvre and SMEs could now compete with the 
big state-run companies. Notably though, while this presented enormous 
opportunities for entrepreneurship in Zambia, it came with challenges too. For 
example, aside from domestic competition SMEs now also faced international 
competition. In recognising that small firms still encountered hurdles, the 
government replaced the SID Act with the Small Enterprise Development (SED) 
Act of 1996. This revised Act included many tax incentives for SMEs. 
Unfortunately, both the SID Act and SED Act only had a ‘negligible’ influence on 
small enterprise development in the country, mostly because the political will to 
actually implement policies and programmes was weak, if not totally lacking 
(Chisala, 2008:7). 
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Following the relative failure of this legislation to aid enterprise development, the 
Zambia Development Agency (ZDA) Act of 2006 became the latest statutory 
attempt to promote the SME sector in Zambia. Through this Act, an MSME 
Development Policy was developed. As the past documents, it also pointed out the 
significance of clustering as an instrument for small business development in 
Zambia. One of its explicit objectives was to enhance LED by establishing five 
business incubators and five industrial parks in identified locations, to be 
completed by 2018 (MCTI, 2008:12). As the first step, the government 
commissioned a study in conjunction with the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organisation (UNIDO) and the World Trade Centre to determine 
the cost of creating industrial clusters in the different Zambian districts (Chitala, 
2012:4). The preliminaries indicated that 150 such clusters are to be created 
(Lumpa, 2012). 
The concept and practice of business incubation is not a new one in Zambia. 
Hyman et al. (1993) noted that a few incubators had been established earlier in 
Zambia, to provide both infrastructural and other support to small firms. Like the 
SBDC hives in South Africa, these common-site facilities provided essential 
infrastructure like water and power as well as support services such as marketing 
and bookkeeping assistance while charging their tenants below market rentals. 
There was, however, no study that determined the effectiveness of existing 
incubators in terms of stimulating business activities that would not have 
otherwise developed. Moreover, it was unknown whether the provision of extra 
services by business incubators over and above physical workspace had improved 
firm performance (Hyman et al., 1993:108). Overall, it is clear that artificially 
created clusters in the country have not been very effective for small enterprise 
development in Zambia. Thus, currently, the natural form of business clustering 
remains the most visible type in the country, being dominated by informal traders 
and vendors in streets and markets and around major activities like mining and 
agriculture. These clusters are unsystematic and firms usually stay static and those 
that survive do so through sheer determination. 
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5.6 CONCLUSION 
Incubation and cluster practices in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and Zambia have been 
briefly considered in this chapter. The practice in these few countries in Africa 
have more or less confirmed the findings from the cases in South Africa, viz. that 
all three categories of clustering do exist – natural, flexible and tightly controlled 
(incubators) – but that the impact has on the whole been very limited so far. In the 
case of the more formal incubators, the numbers are very small and the capacity to 
manage them effectively has been limited. In the case of the more flexible and 
informal or natural clusters, the support via public sector bodies has been very 
limited, leaving most of the supportive activities to voluntary action amongst 
cluster participant SMEs. 
Given these lessons and the experience from South Africa, we can now look into 
the future, identifying the key elements of a comprehensive SME-clustering 
strategy. 
It is very reasonable to conclude that the incubation and cluster issues are general 
to Africa. Most existing and seemingly more useful clusters are natural ones and 
attempts to create clusters have seldom succeeded in the longer term. This has 
important implications for cluster policy as it may help establish a sequence for 
cluster development programmes in an African context. 
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CHAPTER 6: 
LESSONS FOR CLUSTER POLICY AND STRATEGY IN AFRICA 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This study has been underpinned by the realisation that the small business sector 
is critically important for Africa’s efforts to accelerate economic growth, job 
creation and income generation. Economic history all over the world reveals that 
the clustering of business activities can play a very important role in the process 
of small enterprise development. Here we have distinguished three types of 
clustering, viz. natural or incremental clustering, pro-active flexible clustering of 
small businesses and the rigid clustering through incubators. All three types can 
have a positive impact on small business development, but the processes differ 
and the strategies for their acceleration have to be appropriate. 
Having looked somewhat closer at these clustering processes in South Africa as 
well as a few African countries, we now want to draw some conclusions about 
feasible approaches towards effective small business clustering in African 
developing countries. It would be naïve to try to present a comprehensive strategy 
for such efforts, given the vast differences between countries, their business 
structures and legacies and the dynamics of their economic development process. 
All that we can try is to highlight a few insights gained from the more specific 
examples studied and the wider literature surveyed, which might help to guide 
clustering efforts planned in different countries. 
In applying these insights to different countries, it will be important that full 
account is taken of the following differentiating factors: 
• the level and rate of urbanisation in the country, i.e. the existence of larger 
urban centres; 
• the resource structure of the country, which is shaping potential clusters 
(e.g. mineral or agro-processing clusters); 
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• the spatial structure of the country (revealing harbours and transport hubs); 
• the nature and management of local economic development processes 
(revealing scope for pro-active local government action); 
• the existence (or absence) of comprehensive SME-support policies and 
programmes (which can help incubator processes) and 
• the presence of development-orientated larger (foreign or locally controlled) 
corporations in the country. 
As discussed in earlier sections, all of these are factors which shape the 
environment of countries or regions within which clustering takes place and 
within which efforts to strengthen the clustering process are influenced. 
6.2 GENERATING AND SHARING INFORMATION 
As we have shown in various chapters, the process of business clustering is 
complex, slow and in many ways difficult to measure objectively. 
In its most simple variant, it is the growth (over a few years usually) of a trade 
cluster at a particular transport interchange, near a town centre or at some other 
high-contact point. It may also be the concentration of processing mini-factories 
near an agricultural area with steady output. The same could apply to food 
processing establishments in the vicinity of significant numbers of factory or 
office workers. All of these would be examples of natural clusters. 
What is needed here is the careful observation of these processes and the widest 
possible spreading of such information by local authorities, business 
organisations, business consultants and the media in order to make business 
people more aware of the existence, structure and dynamics of these “emerging 
clusters”. In larger towns, local authorities should be well aware of those dynamic 
processes, since they help small enterprises even without explicit public support. 
More important, awareness of such emerging clusters should prevent public 
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authorities applying policies which might hamper the process (e.g. restricting 
informal enterprises settling around the cluster). 
As a further step in this process, local authorities and business associations might 
try to anticipate areas suitable for the evolution of other clusters (e.g. near new 
industrial areas, transport interchanges or office blocks). With only very limited 
action and expenses they might encourage such clustering or help to give new 
processes greater media attention. 
As far as the flexible “hive-type” clusters are concerned, i.e. the (re-)use of vacant 
buildings for the clustering of small enterprises, the spreading of relevant 
information is also crucial. This applies to practical details about the centres and 
their surrounding (to increase awareness about them and attract more tenants to 
the area), but also information about existing incentives (e.g. low rentals) and the 
dynamics of the local clustering processes. Here the focus shouldn’t just fall on 
the particular building (the “hive” in the narrow sense of the word) but the whole 
neighbourhood, where further SMEs could spread in order to be near the emerging 
cluster (i.e. the virtual hive). 
Finally, the more rigid incubator process also needs a lot of attention to the 
information dimension. First of all, the process of inviting start-up entrepreneurs 
(to be sifted for the admission process) needs wider publicity and a spread of the 
critical information. Secondly, the applicants need sufficient information about the 
incubation process, what is expected from them, what support they can expect and 
how the incubation period ends. Thirdly, there is reliable information necessary 
about the operation of existing incubators, to help public sector planners and 
supporters and to encourage private firms who might be motivated to engage in 
such ventures. 
In the Africa-development context, publicity about effectively managed 
incubators could have the further advantage of possibly alerting potential 
development partners, NGOs or aid agencies about projects to get involved in or 
projects to be complemented. 
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The pro-active generation and sharing of information about the clustering process 
is not a very expensive task nor does it need new organisations. It only needs a 
commitment of local business leaders and the public sector to better profile this 
important process. Where the process becomes more technical, partnerships with 
local universities or other research bodies might help. 
6.3 GOVERNMENT SUPPORT AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIPS 
In much of the discussion about small business incubators, it is assumed or 
postulated that such projects have to be “run” by the public sector. This usually 
applies not only to the fact that the bulk of the funding for incubators has to come 
from the public sector, but also that the project is state-owned and managed. 
At the same time, much of the feedback from existing incubators suggests that 
state ownership, control and management is often a major cause of problems and a 
reason for the failure of such centres. This may relate to different factors, like 
excessive expectations of tenants about the support from government, the 
bureaucratic nature of state-managed enterprises or the lack of a business 
approach to such projects. 
Thus, we are looking for an approach where the national government provides 
significant financial support for clustering programmes, but does not insist on 
directly owning or managing individual projects. That task may rather involve 
local municipalities, development agencies (like the SBDC or SEDA in South 
Africa), local cooperatives or private bodies. In these cases the owners/managers 
may also be responsible for some of the funding and carry some of the risks. 
What we are talking about here is the use of public-private partnerships to fund, 
organise and manage the clustering process, with the financial partnership role of 
government particularly important in the case of tightly structured incubators. In 
the case of flexible hives and natural clusters, the main role of government would 
be the facilitation of a favourable operating environment for SMEs. 
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In the African development context, critical responsibilities would be to help with 
or finance the expansion of infrastructure facilities (electricity, roads/rail, water, 
sewage, etc.) to keep up with the increasing demand. Government may also be 
able to play a useful, facilitator role in the bringing together of the other relevant 
P-P partners. 
6.4 RIGID INCUBATORS 
Much of the literature on clustering focuses on this type of incubators, i.e. projects 
which are sector-focused, fairly sophisticated in the technology utilised, relatively 
small in the number of participants and with a clear time limit to the period spent 
by “incubates” in the incubator. Their strength is the expected supply of all the 
relevant support services while the start-up firms are inside the incubator. This 
results in relatively high costs for comprehensive incubators, which increases the 
financial dependence on public sector support (and the difficulty to continue after 
that support terminates). 
Given the many shortcomings in the business environment of SMEs in African 
economies, one might argue that these comprehensive incubators are exactly what 
African countries need. Yet, financial and management constraints make them 
risky and most of the time not feasible. If the size of the incubator is kept small, 
economies of scale cannot be achieved and unit costs are too high. As far as the 
management is concerned, we already referred to problems with public sector 
management. Private sector managers may not be affordable for the centres, 
whilst the other approach – co-operative management – also has high risks 
attached. 
In a few subsectors, conventional, modern incubators may be feasible in Africa, 
like ICT-focused projects, agri-processing centres in the case of high-value 
products, office parks for professionals and science parks linked to universities. 
Yet, even here questions arise around the maximum period for which incubatees 
are allowed to remain in the centres. 
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Thus, it seems likely that successive comprehensive incubators will in the near 
future remain exceptions and rare cases across Africa, although there are likely to 
be cases where an appropriate partnership between the public sector and core 
(long-term) external funders results in successful cases. Spreading greater 
knowledge about these examples of successful incubators should be one of the 
key challenges ahead. 
6.5 FLEXIBLE INCUBATORS 
Whilst much of the serious literature about clustering tends to focus on structured 
incubators, flexible types of incubators constitute the majority of practical cases 
and should probably be viewed as the clustering path likely to dominate in 
developing Africa. 
From our discussions in earlier chapters, the following developments can be seen 
as part of flexible incubation processes: 
• Incubators which do not enforce rigid entry and/or exit policies. 
• Incubators where some of the units in the core centre are occupied by non-
incubatees (to fill the centre or allow dynamic enterprises to stay on). 
• Centres operating like the South African hives, which accommodate SMEs, 
but without necessarily offering a full package of incubator support 
programmes. These centres might still be sector-focused or they could have 
an evolving structure. 
• Virtual incubators, where the incubatees are operating at diverse locations 
(close to a formal incubator or hive or at a distance), but with some link to 
support services and joint efforts coordinated at a central place. 
• Incubators where the physical accommodation is privately supplied, but 
some of the public or privately funded support programmes are tightly 
structured, with clear entrance and exit conditions. 
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These flexible types of cluster support models would fit in well with the complex 
type of natural clustering processes, which we currently find across Africa. Thus, 
the approach would be different in small rural villages, which try to create and 
accelerate an initial phase of local small business clustering. Here the 
municipality, some local larger enterprise (e.g. a mining venture) or a cooperative 
initiative might trigger the process. It would also be much different in the centre 
or the industrial area of medium-sized towns where physical accommodation 
facilities are less important than the clustering of support services (training, 
banking facilities, mentorship facilities and depots with leasable machinery). 
A dynamic approach to such flexible clustering would put equal emphasis on the 
expansion of private sector facilities or programmes and on public sector support. 
The latter would have to focus on infrastructure facilities and bottlenecks while 
the private sector could supply financial, marketing and some of the training 
facilities. In fact, some of the services could be supplied by both public sector 
schemes and private sector services, with the public support focusing on specific 
target groups. 
Seen over time, one can also strategise that the initial phase of cluster support may 
have to be public sector (or foreign development aid) “driven”, with subsequent 
phases and the broadening of the process more and more private sector driven. In 
such a process, the effective spread of information – about clustering processes 
and the potential for expansion – may be one of the tasks needing strong public 
sector support. 
6.6 MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES 
Accepting the need for both flexible and more rigid clustering and incubator 
processes in African development, the real challenge now lies with the leadership 
and management side of the process. Here again there are different dimensions at 
issue, including the following: 
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• the ability of public sector officials to understand the need and scope for 
pro-active small business clustering efforts and for the public sector to play 
a critical role in those processes; 
• the ability of the public sector to provide competent staff to manage its 
involvement in those processes, including its ability and willingness to 
partner with private, NGO, donor agency and other partners; 
• the awareness of private sector business leaders (in corporates, business 
associations and cooperative ventures, for example) about the need and 
potential of clustering efforts and the pro-active role that they can and 
should play in it; 
• the competence of public or private sector managers of such processes (e.g. 
to manage a hive or an incubator or to administer some SME-support 
programme (like a mentorship scheme or an equipment letting scheme) and 
• the ability for public or private sector leaders to critically, yet constructively 
analyse progress with existing clustering programmes and to plan 
adjustments in the process to improve overall performance. 
If we look at the (slow) progress of pro-active clustering efforts in South Africa 
and other African countries, it is most often a lack of effective management in 
these spheres which delays progress. As it is in so many other areas of the 
development process, the lack of competent staff is the critical issue. It is here, 
where the role of foreign development agencies, foreign government assistance 
and foreign private sector partnerships may come in as a significant development 
catalyst. If properly handled, they might supply such expertise for a transitional 
period and/or they may play a significant role in the generation of local 
management capacity. 
Apart from such external support, the public-private partnership approach 
recommended for the clustering strategy could also help overcome this dilemma. 
Yet, this assumes a willingness of both sides to accept such partnership inputs 
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(e.g. to second an experienced corporate manager to manage a publicly funded 
incubator). 
Another dimension of this management dilemma is the fact that progress with pro-
active clustering strategies and programmes will inevitably be slow. There will be 
much “learning by doing” and lots of obstacles to overcome. This constitutes a 
further challenge, viz. for the media and critical observers to view progress in the 
broader context rather than merely on the basis of incubator “graduation rates” or 
occupancy levels. 
6.7 FINANCIAL CHALLENGES 
It is conventional in the small business scene that entrepreneurs put “lack of 
access to finance” forward as their greatest problem and the reason for their 
failure. Yet, closer scrutiny of the complex SME-scene shows that all too often the 
real or underlying reason of the unwillingness of banks to fund, are other 
problems. These could include poor management, incorrect costing and pricing, 
unrealistic market expectations or lack of operational skills. Due to those 
shortcomings, the firms get into a loss-situation, which makes them look for 
overdraft or loan facilities. Naturally, banks realise the risk of funding an 
enterprise which works at a loss, yet wants to increase its (uncovered) loans. 
The same dilemma may apply to formal clustering programmes, which are often 
presented as lacking the necessary finance. Frequently, plans for incubators or 
hive-support programmes are too ambitious, yet hope to catch public funding with 
impressive plans. Once the results turn out disappointing (as it should have been 
expected, given so many natural obstacles) vaguely promised follow-up finance 
may not be available. It is also possible that initially the full scope for public-
private partnerships had not been explored, so that private funding opportunities 
were not realised. The same may apply to the search for and utilisation of NGO-
inputs and (foreign) donor funding for aspects of the programme (e.g. a 
mentorship scheme). 
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Thus, the financial challenges around pro-active clustering efforts are real and 
should certainly not be underestimated. However, a pragmatic, incremental 
approach, utilising different partnerships and subsidiary support programmes, 
together with proper management of the whole initiative may help a lot to 
overcome financial challenges. 
6.8 CONCLUSION: MOVING TOWARDS A STRATEGY 
As stated at the outset of this chapter, it was not the intention to detail all the 
relevant elements of an “incubator strategy” for African countries. Yet, after we 
covered several critical aspects of the strategizing process, we can conclude this 
chapter with a few critical aspects that need to be included in pro-active cluster 
strategies adapted to the respective countries or areas. 
The first basic step is to get clarity about the economic development structure and 
dynamics of the country (or region) and the existence of clustering processes, be 
they formal or informal. That dynamic has to be widely publicised and it should 
be well understood by business leaders, business associations, public officials and 
all the parties involved in clustering efforts. 
This sensitising process should include open debates about the longer run trend of 
sector developments, the competitive position of the country compared to its 
neighbours, ongoing clustering plans and the success of past efforts. Against this 
background potential projects and how they could be tackled should be scrutinised 
to see what types of partnerships might be established. 
This second phase should lead to clear priorities in the planned clustering process, 
with the emphasis on the most appropriate sector(s) to push the appropriate 
partnership basis for specific projects and the source of initial and follow-up 
funding. 
Against that background, it should become clear what (if any) formal incubators 
are planned and how they should be partnered, and what the scope and focus for 
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more flexible clustering efforts should be, with much of those initiatives left to the 
private sector. In this third phase, the potential role of foreign donors, and 
agencies or multi-national corporations in the more formal projects should also 
become clear. 
The strategy has to make it clear that the management of the different strategy 
phases and the project will be crucial for its success and that the funding will have 
to be tackled in a flexible, pragmatic way. 
Finally, the strategy has to provide for the regular review of progress and the 
pragmatic adjustment of plans in the light of progress and challenges. 
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CHAPTER 7: 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Clustering of enterprises offers a channel through which SMEs can overcome 
market obstacles and grow. It can also foster the entrepreneurial spirit and lead to 
the proliferation of new SME establishments. The clustering process can be 
natural as well as deliberately instituted. Increasingly, African countries are 
seeking to use clustering to render support to small and medium firms. This study 
has endeavoured to examine how clustering can in fact effectively aid small 
enterprise development in Africa. The paper distinguishes between clusters that 
have a rigid structure and those that operate flexibly. 
The challenges that continue to ravage small enterprises and their development on 
the African continent include inadequate access to sources of finance, poor 
infrastructure and insufficient access to markets. These hurdles often confine 
small businesses to survivalist activities with little prospect for growth. Current 
interventions to support small enterprise development in Africa seem to fail in 
their mission. Theoretically, cluster development programmes appear to offer 
solutions to many of the constraints to small business development. Clusters have 
certainly shown the potential to enhance business development in practice. They 
bear the ability to, among others, improve the competitiveness of a region through 
enhanced industrial capacity, encourage more small business formation, raise the 
export potential of firms and steer regional development.  
In its examination, the project mainly employs two case studies on incubation and 
cluster experiences in South Africa. One is an example of rigid clustering, i.e. 
business incubation with a clear structure of operation and the other case 
represents a flexible form of clustering with no conscious structure. Moreover, 
references to cases of clustering in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Zambia 
supplement the discussion on the appropriateness of clustering in the African 
situation. The research results show that incubators usually support the creation of 
new SMEs in the short run as long as they remain under incubation. Even so, 
these rigid clusters tend to limit enterprise development due to strict admission 
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criteria and limited physical spaces. Their long-term financial sustainability is 
questionable, because they cannot cover operating costs and are too reliant on 
state funding. Flexible clusters, on the other hand, are more effective for 
enterprise development in Africa because they are not constrained by the factors 
affecting incubators. 
For clustering in general to be a helpful tool in Africa, there is need to improve the 
collection and distribution of data and information on business incubation and 
clustering experiences on the continent. In addition, local government 
involvement in the creation and implementation of cluster policy should be 
prioritised, leaving central government to expand the infrastructure and facilitate 
an enabling environment for clusters to thrive. Additionally, issues of financial 
sustainability should be carefully considered for business incubators to reduce 
their dependence on government aid. Shortages of qualified cluster management 
staff and expansion capacity constraints also have to be dealt with. And lastly, 
clustering in Africa should be sector-focused, since too broad-based an approach 
will defeat the purpose. 
Presently, most of Africa does not have an environment which favours the use of 
small business incubators to drive enterprise development, given the issues 
highlighted in the study. The nature of most business activities is still low-tech 
and labour-intensive. Thus, governments in the developing countries should not 
try to create incubators in arbitrarily selected places, but rather target areas that 
show natural cluster formation and step in to catalyse the process. It is from these 
sorts of clusters that technology diffusion and other industrial progress may 
facilitate the development of incubators. In addition, incubators should not be too 
rigid because considerable flexibility is needed in the African development 
context. But, whilst the research suggests that a hybrid version of clustering is a 
better option for Africa at the moment, instituting such clusters without 
identifying their viability around a particular location and sector will likely be a 
waste of resources. 
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The recommendations made in this project are not unique and are in no way 
exhaustible. They are merely an attempt to contribute the rising calls for the 
relevant authorities to be serious about cluster development policy formulation 
and implementation in Africa. Whether these powers will heed those calls 
ultimately determines the direction and shape of small enterprise development in 
Africa. 
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APPENDIX I: 
FURNTECH DATA2 (2006-2011) 
Table A1.1: Occupancy Rates 
Year Available Space Occupied Space Occupancy Rate (%) 
2001/2002       
2002/2003       
2003/2004       
2004/2005       
2005/2006       
2006/2007 58 35 60 
2007/2008 58 49 84 
2008/2009 74 57 77 
2009/2010 89 49 55 
2010/2011 89 44 49 
 
Table A1.2: Ratio of operating income to operating cost 
Year Operating Income (OI)3 Operating Cost (OC) OI:OC Ratio 
2001/2002       
2002/2003       
2003/2004       
2004/2005       
2005/2006       
2006/2007 3530956 13472405 0.26 
2007/2008 2532337 13482193 0.19 
2008/2009 1308804 15782074 0.08 
2009/2010 2095409 15005178 0.14 
2010/2011 3854195 21973003 0.18 
 
Table A1.3: Ratio of public funding to private funding 
Year Public Private Ratio 
2001/2002       
2002/2003       
2003/2004       
2004/2005       
2005/2006       
2006/2007 10060400 2882371 3.49 
2007/2008 8881872 4590533 1.93 
2008/2009 10122496 3422153 2.96 
2009/2010 13418033 2585901 5.19 
2010/2011 12200265 2929256 4.16 
                                                
2
 Aggregates for all established Furntech centres according to the Furntech annual reports 
3
 Excludes income from grants 
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Table A1.4: Graduation Rates 
Year Graduates Tenants Graduation rate (%) 
2001/2002       
2002/2003       
2003/2004       
2004/2005       
2005/2006       
2006/2007 0 35 0 
2007/2008 17 49 35 
2008/2009 9 57 16 
2009/2010 8 49 16 
2010/2011 7 44 16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
